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Why Sentencing by a Judge Satisfies the Right to Jury
Trial: A Comparative Law Look at Blakely and Booker
Susan F. Mandiberg*
I. INTRODUCTION
In the last quarter of the twentieth century, Congress and many state
legislatures adopted mandatory, determinate sentencing systems. These systems
continued the traditional practice of sentencing by judges, but severely restricted
the ability to customize the sentence to individual circumstances. Removing such
judicial discretion was a major step in advancing punishment goals and achieving
more uniform and predictable sentencing. Nevertheless, in a series of cases
decided between 2004 and 2007, the Supreme Court held that several of these
schemes were unconstitutional. The Court declared that "[o]ther than the fact of a
prior conviction, any fact that increases the penalty for a crime beyond the
prescribed statutory maximum must be submitted to a jury, and proved beyond a
reasonable doubt."' Nevertheless, the Court did not mandate jury fact finding for
all sentencing decisions. Legislatures can continue the practice of judicial
sentencing, but only if judges have substantial discretion to find facts, weigh
them, and choose a sentence within the range set by the jury's verdict. Such a
system of judicial sentencing satisfies a defendant's Sixth Amendment right to
jury trial.
This conclusion is puzzling. When the legislature authorizes a range of
punishment for a particular crime, a jury provides protection at the upper end
through its ability to acquit the defendant. However, even when convicted, most
defendants are not in danger of receiving the maximum sentence. On the
contrary, for most people convicted of a crime, the facts that matter are those that
result in some lesser sentence, and those facts may constitutionally be found by a
judge. But why should this be so? If jury fact finding is essential to establishing
the maximum sentence, why is it not also essential to establishing the sentence
that is actually imposed? Why does sentencing by a judge satisfy the Sixth
Amendment right to jury trial?
This article suggests that the answer lies in the nature of the judge's role in
the common law jury trial. The common law afforded the judge broad discretion
to thwart the directives of the legislature and the desires of the prosecution, and
this independence extended to sentencing. It is true that mandatory sentences
existed in England, in the colonies, and in nineteenth-century United States.
However, criminal trial courts had a variety of discretionary mechanisms to avoid
* Professor of Law, Lewis & Clark Law School. J.D., 1975, University of California at Berkeley (Boalt
Hall). I am grateful for the helpful insights of Michael Vitiello, Stefano Maffei, and colleagues who participated
in the Lewis & Clark Law School faculty colloquium, and for the invaluable research assistance of Sarah
Koteen, Jean Kallage Sinnott, and Mark Strandberg. Any errors are, of course, my own.
1. Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466,490 (2000).
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imposing mandatory sentences that seemed unjust to individual defendants.
During the early twentieth century, indeterminate sentencing replaced mandatory
sentencing for most crimes. This new approach maximized the ability of judges
to effect individualized justice. However, the late twentieth-century mandatory
sentencing schemes broke from this tradition, essentially eliminating
individualized justice for the first time in the United States. In overturning those
schemes, the Supreme Court has restored the "right to jury trial" as a right to
flexibility and individualization throughout the trial and sentencing process.
However, history does not provide the complete answer. The notion that the
"right to jury trial" means the right to a trial court with significant sentencing
discretion is buttressed by comparing the common law system with the civil law,
or Continental, approach. Discretion characterizes the common law criminal trial
in general, including the judicial role. Conversely, discretion is anathema to the
civil law model of criminal justice. Indeed, at least some Justices had this
contrast in mind when the Supreme Court found constitutional fault with the
mandatory, determinate sentencing schemes.2 Such schemes may produce
efficiency and uniformity, similar to civil law systems; however, the Framers
opted to reject these values in favor of freedom from state control of criminal
justice.3
This article suggests that the Sixth Amendment right to jury trial guarantees
defendants an adjudication and sentencing scheme in which the legislature does
not have the last word on a defendant's fate.4 If the trial court as a unit-both jury
and judge-has significant discretion to thwart legislative mandates, the Sixth
Amendment right is satisfied.5 Section II reviews the Court's cases connecting
sentencing to the Sixth Amendment right to jury trial. Section III.A shows that
the common law trial court, consisting of the judge-jury unit, traditionally had
broad discretion to avoid imposing unjust sentences in individual cases. Section
III.B explores how this trial court discretion is characteristic of the common law
tradition, in contrast to the civil law approach as exemplified by post-
Revolutionary France.6 Section IV concludes that the determinate sentencing
schemes represented a move toward the civil law tradition; the Court's recent
cases, in contrast, brought sentencing back within the common law fold.
2. See Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. 296, 313 (2004) (contrasting the common law and civil law
traditions regarding trial-court fact finding). Justices Stevens, Souter, Thomas, and Ginsburg joined Justice
Scalia in this opinion. Id. at 297. For the relevance of the passage in Blakely to the issue of judicial discretion,
see infra Part IIB. 1.
3. Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 498 (2000) (Scalia, J., concurring).
4. Mandatory sentencing schemes can shift the locus of power to prosecutors as well as to legislatures.
See Rachel E. Barkow, Separation of Powers and the Criminal Law, 58 STAN. L. REV. 989, 1041-42 (2006).
This article, however, focuses on trial-court independence from legislative mandates.
5. Cf id. at 994 (treating judge and jury as a unit for purposes of separation-of-powers analysis).
6. For an explanation of the emphasis on post-Revolutionary France, see infra Part IM.B. I.
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II. SENTENCING AND THE SIXTH AMENDMENT RIGHT TO JURY TRIAL
The jury has been the presumed fact finder in criminal trials in the common
law tradition for centuries.' However, as this tradition has played out in the
United States, the jury has increasingly functioned as a gatekeeper; its finding of
guilt opens the door to a second hearing in which the judge, sitting alone,
imposes a sentence, the severity of which depends upon facts other than those the
jury considered. 8
For most of the twentieth century9 the jury carried out this gatekeeper
function' ° under an "indeterminate sentencing" model." This model gave the
judge total discretion to choose a sentence between the absolute maximum and
the mandatory minimum, if any, set by the legislature. Judges did not have to
make formal findings of fact, and there was no meaningful review of the
substance of the sentence.' 2 The indeterminate sentencing model resulted from
late nineteenth-century reform movements and was influenced by the new
disciplines of sociology and psychology. Not surprisingly, this sentencing model
7. See infra Part nI.B.2.
8. Rachel E. Barkow, Recharging the Jury: The Criminal Jury's Constitutional Role in an Era of
Mandatory Sentencing, 152 U. PA. L. REV. 33, 100-01 (2003) (noting that the move away from fixed sentences
for felonies began before the U.S. Constitution was framed and became the norm in the nineteenth- and
twentieth-centuries). The Supreme Court has used the gatekeeper concept in a more negative sense. See Jones v.
United States, 526 U.S. 227,243-44 (1999) ("If a potential penalty might rise from 15 years to life on a nonjury
determination, the jury's role would correspondingly shrink from the significance usually carried by
determinations of guilt to the relative importance of low-level gatekeeping .... ").
9. In earlier centuries, the jury's verdict was often preliminary to a judge's use of a variety of discretionary
mechanisms that would mitigate the effect of ostensibly mandatory sentences. See infra notes 77-113.
10. See generally Barkow, supra note 8, at 70-71; Douglas A. Berman, Foreword: Beyond Blakely and
Booker: Pondering Modern Sentencing Process, 95 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 653, 654-55 (2005); Frank 0.
Bowman, III, The Failure of the Federal Sentencing Guidelines: A Structural Analysis, 105 COLUM. L. REV.
1315, 1321-23 (2005) [hereinafter Bowman, Failure]; Frank 0. Bowman, III, Fear of Law: Thoughts on Fear of
Judging and the State of the Federal Sentencing Guidelines, 44 ST. Louis U. L.J. 299, 300-05 (2000)
[hereinafter Bowman, Fear]; Susan R. Klein, The Return of Federal Judicial Discretion in Criminal Sentencing,
39 VAL. U. L. REV. 693, 698-99 (2005); William T. Pizzi, A Comparative Perspective on the Sentencing Chaos
in the U.S., 6 GLOBAL JURIST ToPics at 2-6 (2006), http://www.bepress.com/gi/topics/vol6/iss l/art2/.
11. The term "indeterminate" has two meanings. The meaning highlighted here involves statutes that
give judges a broad range of options, not only to choose among fines, probation conditions, and prison, but also
to choose a maximum term of incarceration if prison was the punishment. See, e.g., Mistretta v. United States,
488 U.S. 361, 363 (1989); Kevin R. Reitz, Sentencing Guideline Systems and Sentence Appeals: A Comparison
of Federal and State Experiences, 91 Nw. U. L. REV. 1441, 1442-43 (1997). Another meaning of
"indeterminate" applies in systems that allow parole: regardless of the maximum term announced by the court,
the prisoner's actual time in prison is set by a parole board. Based on the prisoner's behavior inside and
potential for rehabilitation outside, the parole board can release a convict far earlier than the judge had decreed.
See, e.g., Bowman, Fear, supra note 10, at 301-03.
12. See, e.g., Bowman, Failure, supra note 10, at 1322; accord Koon v. United States, 518 U.S. 81, 96
(1996). Cf Gerhard 0. W. Mueller, Penology on Appeal: Appellate Review of Legal but Excessive Sentences,
15 VAND. L. REV. 671, 672-74 (1962) (demonstrating that there was no meaningful review of sentences even
before indeterminate sentencing). Appellate courts could, of course, correct a sentence that was
unconstitutional.
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championed individualization and the goal of rehabilitation.' 3 The United States
Supreme Court upheld the constitutionality of this model in Williams v. New
York.
14
In the late twentieth century, however, many jurisdictions abandoned this
model and substituted a structured sentencing approach.'5 The change grew out of
disillusionment with indeterminate sentencing. Rehabilitation did not seem to be
working." In addition, indeterminate sentencing produced great inconsistencies
in the treatment of persons convicted of the same or similar crimes.'7 The lack of
uniformity seemed unfair and also made it difficult for a particular defendant to
predict the likely sentence if convicted. The structured sentencing schemes, on
the other hand, while differing in mechanics, had one attribute in common-they
all restricted the exercise of judicial sentencing discretion.
The guideline sentencing scheme adopted by the federal government
provides a useful example of one approach to structured sentencing.'" The
guidelines and accompanying application directions are comprehensive and
relatively precise.' 9 Judges must explain their factual and legal decisions,
outlining their application of the guidelines to the case at hand. 20 Either the
prosecution or the defense can seek de novo review of both facts and law. 2' As
originally established,22 judges had unreviewable discretion only within the small
sentencing range that results from application of the rules.23 Compared to
13. See, e.g., Barkow, supra note 8, at 71, 87; Berman, supra note 10, at 654; Bowman, Failure, supra
note 10, at 1321; Bowman, Fear, supra note 10, at 300-01.
14. 337 U.S. 241 (1949).
15. For a history of the move toward determinate sentencing, see, for example, Barkow, supra note 8, at
84-89; Berman, supra note 10, at 655-59; Bowman, Failure, supra note 10, at 1322-23; Bowman, Fear, supra
note 10, at 314-16; Klein, supra note 10, at 699-702. For a brief description of varieties in determinate
sentencing models, see, for example, Pizzi, supra note 10, at 6-10.
16. See, e.g., Douglas A. Berman & Stephanos Bibas, Making Sentencing Sensible, 4 OHIO ST. J. CRIM.
L. 37, 46-49 (2006) (noting that the shift from indeterminate to determinate sentencing reflects a rejection of the
goal of rehabilitation in favor of retribution and deterrence).
17. Cf. Mueller, supra note 12, at 674-75 (noting tension between "classical penology's" emphasis on
harm and mental state and individualized sentencing).
18. See generally UNITED STATES SENTENCING COMMISSION, GUIDELINES MANUAL. For a description
of how the guidelines work, see, for example, Barkow, supra note 8, at 89-94, and Bowman, Failure, supra
note 10, at 1323-26.
19. See generally UNITED STATES SENTENCING COMMISSION, GUIDELINES MANUAL. See also Bowman,
Failure, supra note 10, at 1347 ("[Tjhe guidelines rules for applying the sentencing table have literally doubled
in length since 1987."); 0. Kate STITH & JOSE A. CABRANES, FEAR OF JUDGING: SENTENCING GUIDELINES IN
THE FEDERAL COURTS 91-92 (1998) (characterizing guideline fact finding as tedious and complex, comparable
to "agency fact finding given to special tribunals," and giving examples).
20. The judge has to state the reasons for imposing a particular sentence, both in open court and in a
written transcript. 18 U.S.C. § 3553(c) (2000 & Supp. 2008). In addition, a judge who departs from the
guideline sentence normally has to state the reasons for doing so "with specificity in the written order of
judgment and commitment...." 18 U.S.C. § 3553(c)(2) (Supp. 2008).
21. See infra note 59.
22. See discussion infra notes 56-61. The Court revised this portion of the scheme in United States v.
Booker, 543 U.S. 220 (2005).
23. See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 3742 (2000 & Supp. 2008); Bowman, Failure, supra note 10, at 1326.
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previous federal approaches, the shift caused by this system was dramatic: as far
as sentencing was concerned, federal courts had essentially become
administrative arms of Congress and the United States Sentencing Commission.
However, in 2006, the Supreme Court declared this system to be
unconstitutional. In its place, the Court made the guidelines advisory25 and
clarified that the trial court's decision could be reversed only if it was
unreasonable. 6
The demise of the federal mandatory guideline system came toward the end
of a series of cases beginning in 1998,27 in which the Court considered the
sentencing roles of legislatures, juries, and judges.28 The cases concerned
structured sentencing schemes that shared one characteristic. Through a variety
29of mechanisms, these systems allowed or required the judge to impose a more
24. United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220 (2006).
25. Id. at 259-60 (requiring sentencing judges to calculate the guideline sentence to advise their decisions);
see also id. at 233 (noting that merely advisory guidelines "would not implicate the Sixth Amendment"). Booker
involved two different majorities: one that determined the constitutional merits (id. at 225) and a different one that
held that the guidelines would be treated as advisory. id. at 244. However, both majorities agreed that such advisory
guidelines would comport with the Sixth Amendment. Id. at 233 ("If the Guidelines as currently written could be
read as merely advisory provisions that recommended, rather than required, the selection of particular sentences in
response to differing sets of facts, their use would not implicate the Sixth Amendment."); id. at 245 (adopting the
remedy of advisory guidelines).
26. Id. at 260-61. In the new federal advisory guideline scheme, an appellate court can reverse a sentence
that is unreasonable. See infra notes 61-68 (discussing later development of the "reasonableness" review standard).
27. In chronological order, these cases are: Almendarez-Torres v. United States, 523 U.S. 224 (1998);
Jones v. United States, 526 U.S. 227 (1999); Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466 (2000); Harris v. United
States, 536 U.S. 545 (2002); Ring v. Arizona, 583 U.S. 584 (2002); Biakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. 296
(2004); United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220 (2006); and Cunningham v. California, 127 S. Ct. 856 (2007). So
many articles have provided a detailed review of the cases that it seems pointless to repeat the exercise here. For
such reviews, see, for example, Berman, supra note 10, at 664-79; Klein, supra note 10, at 703-19; Pizzi, supra
note 10, at 10-22; Ian Weinstein, The Revenge of Mullaney v. Wilbur: United States v. Booker and the
Reassertion of Judicial Limits on Legislative Power to Define Crimes, 84 OR. L. REv. 393, 412-30 (2005). In
addition, in the same time frame the Court decided a number of cases on related issues; again in chronological
order these are: Witte v. United States, 515 U.S. 389 (1995) (regarding double jeopardy); Koon v. United
States, 518 U.S. 81 (1996) (regarding standard on review of departures from the guidelines); United States v.
Watts, 519 U.S. 148 (1997) (regarding double jeopardy); and Monge v. California, 524 U.S. 721 (1998)
(regarding double jeopardy).
28. Some basic parameters remained uncontroversial. The legislature has the power to define the elements
constituting a crime. Jones, 526 U.S. at 243 n.6, 252 n. 11. The legislature can also determine the range of
punishment-that is, the minimum and maximum penalties-for that crime. Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 490 n.16
(indicating that the legislative function is to determine a maximum sentence that does not "exceed[] that which is,
in the legislature's judgment, generally proportional to the crime"); Jones, 526 U.S. at 243 n.6 (addressing
maximum penalty); Harris, 536 U.S. 545 (reconfirming legislature's power to set mandatory minimums);
McMillan v. Pennsylvania, 477 U.S. 79 (1986) (establishing legislature's power to set mandatory minimums). The
prosecution must allege the elements in the charging instrument and prove them beyond a reasonable doubt to a
jury (or to a judge when the defendant waives the jury). See generally Patterson v. New York, 432 U.S. 197 (1977);
Mullaney v. Wilbur, 421 U.S. 684 (1975); In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358 (1970). No member of the Court has
challenged these basic principles.
29. Ring, 583 U.S. 584 (capital punishment scheme that allowed judges to find facts supporting death
penalty); Blakely, 542 U.S. 296 (multi-statute scheme limiting punishment to standard range, but allowing higher
punishment if judge found additional facts); Booker, 543 U.S. 220 (statutorily authorized guideline scheme limiting
punishment to standard range, but allowing higher punishment if judge found additional facts); Cunningham, 127
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serious punishment than the one authorized by the jury's verdict. This higher
maximum sentence was based on "sentencing factors," findings of fact made by
the judge alone and based on a standard lower than proof beyond a reasonable
doubt.30 The Court found all of these models to violate the Sixth Amendment
right to jury trial because they failed to comport with the standard announced in
Apprendi v. New Jersey:
Other than the fact of a prior conviction, any fact that increases the
penalty for a crime beyond the prescribed statutory maximum must be
submitted to a jury, and proved beyond a reasonable doubt. With that
exception, we endorse th[is] statement of the rule ....... [I]t is
unconstitutional for a legislature to remove from the jury the assessment
of facts that increase the prescribed range of penalties to which a
criminal defendant is exposed. It is equally clear that such facts must be
established by proof beyond a reasonable doubt."'"
Although the cases focus on the right to jury trial, they also reveal that the
presence or absence of judicial discretion is a crucial factor in whether a
sentencing system violates that right.32 The importance of judicial discretion
emerges from a comparison between three of the structured sentencing schemes
struck down by the Court and the judicial sentencing schemes that remain
constitutional.33 The disallowed schemes-those of Washington,34 the federal
S. Ct. 856 (statutory presumptive sentencing scheme limiting punishment to middle punishment but allowing
higher sentence if judge found additional facts).
30. See Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 485 (noting that the Court coined the term in McMillan "to refer to a fact
that was not found by a jury but that could affect the sentence imposed by the judge"); see also McMillan., 477
U.S. at 86 (using the term); Jones, 526 U.S. at 232-39 (discussing the difference between elements and
sentencing factors); Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 478, 483 n.10, 494 (discussing the difference between sentencing
factors and elements).
31. Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 490 (quoting from the concurring opinions of Justices Stevens and Scalia in
Jones). The Court mentioned due process (id. at 469), but it focused its reasoning on the Sixth Amendment right
to jury trial. Id. at 475-77. Note also that the focus is on the maximum sentence. It is constitutional for the
legislature to impose a mandatory minimum even though, in a very real way, doing so increases the punishment
based on facts not found by the jury. Harris v. United States, 536 U.S. 545 (2002). Compare id. at 572-78
(Thomas, J., dissenting) (explaining how mandatory minimums increase punishment); McMillan, 477 U.S. at
103 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (explaining same).
32. A case before the Court in the 2008 term may indicate how central a factor judicial discretion is. See
Oregon v. Ice, 128 S. Ct. 1657 (2008) (accepting certiorari on the question "[w]hether the Sixth Amendment, as
construed in [Apprendi and Blakely] requires that facts (other than prior convictions) necessary to imposing
consecutive sentences be found by the jury or admitted by the defendant").
33. The Court has also indicated that sentencing by a jury would satisfy the Sixth Amendment right to
jury trial. The legislature can attach a mandatory sentence to the jury's verdict, or it can accomplish jury
sentencing through bifurcated trials. Booker, 543 U.S. at 287 (Stevens, J., dissenting in part); Blakely, 542 U.S.
at 334-37 (Breyer, J., dissenting); see also Cunningham, 127 S. Ct. at 871 n.17 (listing states that, following
Apprendi and Blakely, retained determinate sentencing "by calling upon the jury-either at trial or in a separate
sentencing proceeding--to find any fact necessary to the imposition of an elevated sentence").
34. In the Washington scheme, one statute established an absolute maximum punishment for Class B
felonies. However, a second statute set out a "standard range" with a lower maximum for the Class B felony for
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government,35 and California 36-- employed a similar dynamic. The jury's verdict
established the absolute maximum sentence; however, the law restricted the
punishment to a lower sentence unless the judge found additional facts. These
dynamics meant that the lower sentence was the real maximum sentence for
Sixth Amendment purposes.37 The higher sentence based on judicial fact finding
violated the Apprendi standard.
The two that remain constitutional-indeterminate sentencing3" and the
advisory guidelines approved by the Court for federal sentencing 39-are
superficially similar to these unconstitutional approaches. As with the disallowed
systems, the jury's verdict establishes the absolute maximum sentence, but lower
sentences are possible. Similarly, in both approaches the legislature authorizes
the judge to rely on sentencing factors-facts that do not have to be alleged in the
indictment or proved beyond a reasonable doubt. The difference between these
systems and the unconstitutional schemes is the presence of judicial discretion. In
these valid systems, the judge has complete or almost complete40 discretion to
choose any sentence in the range.4' Indeed, the Court has "never doubted the
authority of a judge to exercise broad discretion in imposing a sentence within a
statutory range.",
42
which the defendant was convicted. The sentence was restricted to this lower maximum, unless the judge found
"substantial and compelling reasons justifying an exceptional sentence." In that case, the judge was allowed
(but not required) to impose the higher sentence. A judge imposing the higher sentence had to base the reasons
on facts other than those used in computing the standard range. The judge had to support an exceptional
sentence with written findings of fact and conclusions of law, and the appellate court could reverse using a
"clearly erroneous" standard if the record was insufficient to support the sentence. Blakely, 542 U.S. at 299-300.
35. In the federal scheme, a statute establishes the absolute maximum punishment. See 18 U.S.C. §
3551. However, the sentencing guidelines normally cap the available punishment at a lower plateau. The court
is limited to the lower punishment unless the judge finds specified facts that increase the punishment ceiling. In
that case, the court is required to impose the higher sentence unless a "departure," also strictly controlled and
fact-based, applies. Booker, 543 U.S. at 234-35.
36. In the California scheme, "[t]he statute defining the offense prescribes three precise terms of
imprisonment-a lower, middle, and upper term sentence." Cunnigham, 127 S. Ct. at 861. The court was
required to impose the middle sentence unless aggravating or mitigating circumstances justified a higher or
lower sentence. The law provided illustrative circumstances. The judge determined the existence of such
circumstances by finding facts under a "preponderance of evidence" standard. Id. at 862-63.
37. Blakely, 542 U.S. 296; Booker, 543 U.S. 220; Cunningham, 127 S. Ct. 856.
38. Williams v. New York, 337 U.S. 241 (1949), cited with approval in Booker, 543 U.S. at 233;
Blakely, 542 U.S. at 304-05; Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 481; see also Harris v. United States, 536 U.S. 545 (2002)
(regarding mandatory minimums).
39. See supra note 25.
40. See supra note 26.
41. See Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 481 (emphasizing the historical pedigree of judicial exercise of discretion
within the range set by the legislature); Blakely, 542 U.S. at 305 (distinguishing indeterminate sentencing from
Washington's scheme on the ground that the former allowed, but did not compel, a judge to rely on facts
outside the trial record in determining the sentence); Booker, 543 U.S. at 232 (noting the importance in Blakely
of the requirement that judges find additional facts to impose a higher sentence); id. at 233-34 (noting the
importance of the mandatory nature of the sentencing rules in the Court's reasoning); Cunningham, 127 S. Ct. at
859 (emphasizing that California's system is not advisory because judges are not free to exercise their discretion
to choose a sentence within the statutory range).
42. Booker, 543 U.S. at 233 (citing Apprendi and Williams).
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Approval of judicial sentencing-even within the range set by the
legislature-is puzzling given the Court's reliance on the Sixth Amendment right
to jury trial. Although it is true that the verdict sets the absolute maximum
sentence, this determination is irrelevant to most defendants in an indeterminate
or advisory sentencing situation. Consider a first offender convicted of a crime
that carries a maximum penalty of twenty years in prison. Unless that penalty is
mandatory, it is highly unlikely that the defendant will be sentenced to twenty
years. What really matters is whether the judge will choose, say, probation, five
years in prison, or ten years in prison. The judge is likely to base this choice at
least in part on facts that emerge during sentencing but not at trial.
The Court's explanation for allowing judges to base this relevant decision on
sentencing factors is straightforward: "when a trial judge exercises his discretion
to select a specific sentence within a defined range, the defendant has no right to
a jury determination of the facts that the judge deems relevant., 43
This declaration, however, begs the question. Why should a defendant have
no right to a jury determination of one of the most important issues in the case?
Part of the answer involves the Court's vision of the jury's role:
Just as suffrage ensures the people's ultimate control in the legislative
and executive branches, jury trial is meant to ensure their control in the
judiciary. . . . Apprendi carries out this design by ensuring that the
judge's authority to sentence derives wholly from the jury's verdict.
Without that restriction, the jury would not exercise the control that the
Framers intended.... The jury could not function as circuitbreaker in the
State's machinery of justice if it were relegated to making a
determination that the defendant at some point did something wrong, a
mere preliminary to a judicial inquisition into the facts of the crime the
State actually seeks to punish.44
This passage reveals not only the Court's understanding of the jury's role, but
also its assumption that the role is fulfilled once the jury has authorized the
maximum possible sentence.
However, this assumption does not resolve the dilemma. Why should the
jury's role end there? Isn't a "circuitbreaker" needed to affect the decision
whether a person will spend no time in prison or twenty years in prison?4' The
43. Id. (explaining why the federal system would have been constitutional if the guidelines had not been
binding on judges).
44. Blakely, 542 U.S. at 306-07 (emphasis in original).
45. Cf Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 495 (noting, in the context of the absolute maximum sentence, that "it can
hardly be said that the potential doubling of one's sentence-from 10 years to 20-has no more than a nominal
effect"). The Court noted that "[w]hen a judge's finding based on a mere preponderance of the evidence
authorizes an increase in the maximum punishment, it is appropriately characterized as 'a tail which wags the
dog of the substantive offense."' Id. (citing McMillan v. Pennsylvania, 447 U.S. 79, 88 (1986)).
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jury rarely knows the maximum sentence its verdict authorizes, and the judge,
after all, is a government employee who appears to be part of the "State's
machinery of justice.4 7 More to the point, in the advisory guideline system, "the
crime the State actually seeks to punish" is likely to be the crime described by the
guideline factors.48 If judges automatically follow advisory guidelinesn--or, in an
indeterminate system, the prosecutor's sentencing recom•endation 50-the
legislative and executive branches are in control almost as much as they were in
the systems found to be unconstitutional. On the other hand, the Court's
conclusion that defendants have no right to jury determination of sentencing
factors makes sense if the judge is also a circuitbreaker who stands between the
legislature and prosecutor, on one hand, and the individual defendant, on the
other.'
In this regard, it is instructive to note that the metaphor of circuitbreaker does
fit the common law judge in various ways. Consider first the apparent anomaly of
a defendant who pleads guilty or tries the case to the court. This defendant will
never have a jury circuitbreaker at all. The Court purports to address this
dilemma by noting that Sixth Amendment protections are not for those who
waive them. 2 However, this dismissal is misleading. After all, similar to juries,
judges in bench trials can hand down unreviewable acquittals on the merits. 3
Moreover, the Sixth Amendment-based sentencing dynamics continue to apply;
whether a defendant is convicted after a jury trial, a bench trial,54 or a guilty
46. See, e.g., FLA. R. CRIM. P. 3.390(a) ("Except in capital cases, the judge shall not instruct the jury on
the sentence that may be imposed for the offense for which the accused is on trial."). Cf Miximo Langer,
Rethinking Plea Bargaining. The Practice and Reform of Prosecutorial Adjudication in American Criminal
Procedure, 33 AM. J. CRIM. L. 223, 284 (2006) [hereinafter Langer, Plea Bargaining] (suggesting as a reform
that juries be instructed on the potential sentence).
47. See Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 498 (Scalia, J., concurring) (noting that judges are government
employees).
48. Prosecutors can calculate probable guideline sentences prior to bringing charges, and can base
charging decisions on such calculations. The mandatory guideline system gave prosecutors enormous powers to
affect sentencing through their discretion regarding crimes to choose and factors, such as substantial assistance,
to raise at sentencing. See, e.g., Marc L. Miller, Domination and Dissatisfaction: Prosecutors as Sentencers, 56
STAN. L. REV. 1211, 1252-53 (2004).
49. In this regard, it is important to note that facts (and, in the federal system, the guideline analysis) are
provided in "a report compiled by a probation officer who the judge thinks more likely got it right than got it
wrong." Blakely, 542 U.S. at 312. Although compliance with the guidelines has decreased since Booker, as of
May, 2006, 62.6% of federal sentences were still within the guideline range. E.g., Gilles R. Bissonnette,
Comment, "Consulting" the Federal Sentencing Guidelines After Booker, 53 UCLA L. REV. 1497, 1532 (2006)
(citing U.S. Sentencing Commission statistics).
50. See, e.g., Blakely, 542 U.S. at 311 (noting the prosecutor's "power to affect sentences by making
(even nonbinding) sentencing recommendations").
51. Thus, it may be important that compliance with the guidelines has decreased since Booker.
Bissonnette, supra note 49, at 1532. As judges become less socialized to conforming with the guidelines,
increased independence may develop.
52. Blakely, 542 U.S. at 312 ("[Tlhe Sixth Amendment was not written for the benefit of those who
choose to forgo its protection.").
53. See infra note 156.
54. E.g., United States v. Milam, 443 F.3d 382, 385-86 (4th Cir. 2006); State v. Suleiman, 158 Wash. 2d
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plea,5 the sentence is still restricted to the maximum set by the elements of the
crime.
However, the image of judges as circuitbreakers emerges most clearly in the
Court's treatment of appellate review of sentences. When Congress enacted the
Sentencing Reform Act, it provided for appeal of sentences by either party but
did not articulate a standard of review.56 De novo review would arguably chill a
trial court's willingness to exercise discretion, while an abuse of discretion
standard would nurture it. In Koon v. United States,57 a unanimous Court opted
for the abuse of discretion standard to review a trial judge's decision to depart
from the mandatory guideline sentencing range." In response, seeking to limit
trial court discretion, Congress changed the standard to de novo review."
However, this de novo standard was one of the provisions the Booker Court
excised in order to fix the Sixth Amendment problems presented by the federal
sentencing guidelines. 6° In its place, the Court found that the statute implicitly set
forth an unreasonableness standard of review.6'
In three cases decided in 2007, the Court clarified the notion of
"unreasonableness" for reviewing federal advisory guideline sentences,
highlighting the importance of the trial judge's discretion. First, it held that
appellate courts are not required to apply a presumption of reasonableness to
sentences that reflect proper application of the guidelines, although they may do
so if they choose.62 More significantly, a sentence that does not reflect proper
guideline application is not per se unreasonable; indeed, a non-guideline sentence
280, 282 (2006). The bottom line might be different if the defendant waived the right to jury trial specifically as
to sentencing. Milam, 443 F.3d at 386. Accord, e.g., State v. Crary, 140 Wash. App. 1016 (2007).
55. See Blakely, 542 U.S. at 303-04 (equating "the facts ... admitted by the defendant" with the facts
found by the jury).
56. 18 U.S.C. § 3742(a)-(b) (2000) (providing both the defendant and the government with the right to
an appeal); see Booker, 543 U.S. at 259 (noting that these provisions survive the Court's rewriting of the
Sentencing Reform Act).
57. 518 U.S. 81 (1996).
58. Id. at 91, 96-97 (concluding that in mandating appellate review of sentencing Congress intended
"that district courts retain much of their traditional sentencing discretion").
59. Congress took this action in the so-called Feeney Amendment (149 CONG. REC. H2420-22 (daily
ed. Mar. 27, 2003) (amendment by Rep. Feeney)) to the PROTECT Act. Prosecutorial Remedies and Tools
Against the Exploitation of Children Today (PROTECT) Act of 2003, Pub. L. No. 108-21, 117 Stat. 650
(codified as amended in various sections of Titles 18, 28, and 42 of the United States Code). See generally, e.g.,
Katherine M. Menendez, De Novo Review of Sentencing Departures: The End of Koon v. United States, 27
HAMLINE L. REV. 457 (2004). The provision requiring de novo review of departures are found in § 401(d) of the
PROTECT Act.
60. 543U.S.at261.
61. Id. at 260.
62. Rita v. United States, 127 S. Ct. 2456 (2007); see also id. at 2466-67 (holding that the appellate
presumption does not violate the Sixth Amendment fight to jury trial). Justices Stevens and Ginsburg would
afford the same appellate deference to sentences outside the advisory Guideline range as well. 127 S. Ct. at
2470 (Stevens, J., concurring, joined by Justice Ginsburg) (pointing out that the reasonableness review
mandated by Booker is the equivalent of review for abuse of discretion). Justice Souter would afford no
presumption of reasonableness to any sentence. Id. 2488 (Souter, J., dissenting).
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can be based upon either specific facts about the defendant or a policy
disagreement with the guidelines themselves. 63 As the Court pointed out, a per se
unreasonableness approach would make the guidelines effectively mandatory. 64
Thus, even sentences outside the guidelines' range must be reviewed "under a
deferential abuse-of-discretion standard., 65 This means that it is error for the
appellate court to require extraordinary circumstances, 66 rigid mathematical
formulas,67 or even proportional justifications for non-guideline sentences.6' The
result of all of these cases is an advisory guideline system that approaches
indeterminate sentencing: under a seemingly broad sense of reasonableness,
judges are virtually free to ignore advisory guidelines at will.69
These sentencing review cases confirm judicial power to refuse to apply
seemingly unjust legislative mandates; in other words, they confirm that judges
can be circuitbreakers. Importantly, the Court's reasoning in these recent
holdings continued the focus on the Sixth Amendment right to jury trial,7° an
approach that caused Justice Alito to remark that the "yawning gap between the
Sixth Amendment and the Court's opinion [in Kimbrough] should be enough to
show that the Blakely-Booker line of cases has gone astray.",7'
Justice Alito's concern is understandable. Nevertheless, the remainder of this
article suggests that in restoring discretion to judicial sentencing the Court has
moved the criminal justice system closer to the type of jury trial the Framers had
63. Kimbrough v. United States, 128 S. Ct. 558, 564 (2007). The trial court departed from the guidelines
range because it disagreed with the sentencing disparity between crack and pnowder cocaine the guidelines
reflected. Id. at 565. It is perhaps noteworthy that the government argued "that the Guidelines adopting the 100-
to-I ratio are an exception to the 'general freedom that sentencing courts have to apply the [§ 3553(a)]
factors ... because the ratio is a specific policy determination that Congress has directed sentencing courts to
observe."' Id. at 570 (quoting the government's brief).
64. Id. at 564.
65. Gall v. United States, 128 S. Ct. 586, 591 (2007).
66. Id. at 594-95.
67. Id. at 595 (rejecting "the use of a rigid mathematical formula that uses the percentage of a departure
as the standard for determining the strength of the justifications required for a specific sentence").
68. Id. at 591. The appellate court had required a justification that "is proportional to the extent of the
difference between the advisory range and the sentence imposed." Id. at 594. The Court rejected this
requirement but did note that "the extent of the difference. .. is surely relevant" to the reasonableness of the
sentence. Id. at 591.
69. A sentence may, however, be reversed as unreasonable in an extreme case. See, e.g., United States v.
Levinson, No. 07-1544, 2008 WL 4251501, at *8 (3d Cir. Sept. 18, 2008) (finding the trial court's explanation
for departing from the guideline sentence insufficient for failure to explain an apparent policy disagreement
with the guidelines).
70. See Kimbrough v. United States, 128 S. Ct. 558, 570 (2007). (indicating need to be true to Booker's
Sixth Amendment holding); Gall, 128 S. Ct. at 594 (grounding the reasoning in the Booker holding); Rita v.
United States, 127 S. Ct. 2456, 2465-67 (2007) (finding that the presumption of reasonableness comports with
the Sixth Amendment); see also, Kimbrough, 128 S. Ct. at 578-79 (Alito, J., dissenting) (acknowledging Sixth
Amendment basis for Court's holding); Rita, 127 S. Ct. at 2475-77 (Scalia, J., concurring) (suggesting that the
Sixth Amendment allows review of sentences only for procedural error).
71. Gall, 128 S. Ct. at 605-06 (Alito, J., dissenting) (noting that the issue of competence to set
sentencing policy has nothing to do with juries or fact finding).
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in mind-one in which the trial court as a unit, consisting of both judge and jury,
functioned as a circuitbreaker to implement individualized justice.
III. THE PROMINENCE OF DISCRETIONARY JUSTICE IN THE
COMMON LAW TRADITION
A. Trial Court Discretion to Avoid Harsh Penalties
Before the American Revolution, English judges had broad sentencing
discretion in misdemeanors, but felonies were capital crimes for which the law
prescribed even the manner of death]. Similarly, after the American Revolution,
there were mandatory penalties in the U.S. for some crimes73 and discretionary
penalties for others.74 However, even where penalties were ostensibly mandatory,
trial courts had discretionary mechanisms to avoid imposing sanctions that
seemed unjust in the individual case. One mechanism was jury nullification, the
others were judicial: development and use of legal technicalities, benefit of
clergy, suspended execution of sentences, and judicial initiation of a virtually
automatic pardon process.
The common law criminal jury has long had the power of nullification, or
"pious perjury," allowing it to acquit (or to convict of a lesser crime) despite the
prosecutor having proved the elements beyond a reasonable doubt.75 This power
72. E.g., J.H. Baker, Criminal Courts and Procedure at Common Law 1550-1800, in CRIME IN
ENGLAND 1550-1800, at 42-44 (J. Cockburn ed. 1977); SIR WILLIAM HOLDSWORTH, A HISTORY OF ENGLISH
LAW vol. XI, at 557-60 (1938).
73. A mandatory death penalty existed at common law, including, in the earliest days, at federal
common law. Rory K. Little, The Federal Death Penalty: History and Some Thoughts About the Department of
Justice's Role, 26 FORDHAM URBAN L.J. 347, 361-63 (1999). Some early statutes also mandated capital
punishment. For example, an Act for the Punishment of certain Crimes against the United States, I Stat. 112
(Apr. 30, 1790) set mandatory death penalties for treason (§ 1, 1 Stat. 112), willful murder (§ 3, 1 Stat 113),
piracy (§ 8, 1 Stat. 113-114; § 9, 1 Stat. 114, § 10, 1 Stat. 115), and forgery or counterfeiting of "any certificate,
indent, or other public security of the United States" (§ 14, 1 Stat. 115). The mandate sometimes included the
manner of execution. For example, the 1790 federal statute specified that death would be carried out "by
hanging the person convicted by the neck until dead." (§ 33, 1 Stat. 119). Other statutes mandated specific
prison terms or other punishments. For example, in a 1790 federal statute a mandatory part of the sentence for
perjury required the convict to "stand in the pillory for one hour ... " § 18, 1 Stat. 116. See generally Sheldon
Glueck, Principles of a Rational Penal Code, 41 HARV. L. REV. 453, 462-63 (1928); George Lardner, Jr. &
Margaret Colgate Love, Mandatory Sentences and Presidential Mercy: The Role of Judges in Pardon Cases,
1790-1850, 16 FED. SENT. R. 212 (2004); David J. Rothman, Sentencing Reforms in Historical Perspective, 29
CRIME & DELINQUENCY 631, 633 (1983). Mandatory minimums were also popular with Congress in the early
years of the Republic. See, e.g., Lardner & Love, supra, at 212-13.
74. Lardner & Love, supra note 73, at 212 (noting that some statutes fixed the type of punishment but
gave freedom to set the amount within a legislatively determined range and some early statutes gave judges
discretion to choose both the type and the amount of punishment).
75. E.g., J.H. BAKER, AN INTRODUCTION TO ENGLISH LEGAL HISTORY 591 (3d ed. 1990) (noting that
partial verdicts "smacking" of pious perjury are found in court records as early as the fourteenth century, were
common in the seventeenth, and were most frequent in the eighteenth, "when the number of non-clergiable
capital offenses was increased by legislation"); Baker, supra note 72, at 23-24 (noting that "pious perjury" was
an important and frequent exercise of discretion despite attempts by Tudor and Stuart kings in the sixteenth and
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was crucial to individualized justice. Felonies carried mandatory punishments,
and these were generally known the public, including the jurors. As most accused
persons lacked any defense on the merits, "the English criminal jury trial of the
later eighteenth century ... was primarily a sentencing proceeding" in which a
jury's decision on conviction might be based on the justice of the accompanying
sentence as opposed to technical proof of the crime.76 Juries today still have the
power of nullification.
Independently of juries, judges also engaged in their own sort of
nullification. English judges used their common law powers to create technical
rules and complex procedures, which they then applied to avert the conviction of
persons they did not wish to punish. Similar practices existed in the United
States, where courts relied upon rules "as an ad hoc means of saving defendants
from punishments approved of neither by them nor by their contemporaries"
even after "punishments for crime had been brought into line with community
opinion, and defendants had secured the legal rights necessary for an adequate
defense." '78 Today in the United States, factually guilty defendants may be
acquitted through the offspring of these judicially created technical rules. Jury
nullification and legal technicalities allowed trial courts to avoid harsh sentences
by avoiding conviction itself. Other mechanisms also existed, however, that
focused on the sentencing phase.79
One such device available to judges who wanted to avoid imposing a
mandatory death penalty 0 was benefit of clergy, used for centuries prior to the
eighteenth centuries to curtail the practice); Barkow, supra note 8, at 36-37, 50-58 (noting that at the time the
Sixth Amendment was adopted juries had absolute discretion to return a general verdict of acquittal, which
functioned as a safety-valve); John H. Langbein, The English Criminal Trial on the Eve of the French
Revolution, in THE TRIAL JURY IN ENGLAND, FRANCE, GERMANY, 1700-1900, at 36-37 (1987) [hereinafter
Langbein, Eve] (providing examples); JAMES Q. WHITMAN, HARSH JUSTICE: CRIMINAL PUNISHMENT AND THE
WIDENING DIVIDE BETWEEN AMERICA AND EUROPE 169 (2003) (noting that jury nullification was practiced in
the American colonies); see also Barkow, supra note 4, at 1015 (noting that jury nullification checks both
executive and legislative decisions).
76. Langbein, supra note 75, at 37.
77. Baker, supra note 72, at 47 (discussing use of special verdicts combined with submission of the case
to a panel of judges where the trial judge had pre-conviction doubts about the law); id. (discussing the writ of
venire de novo, used to stop or set aside a trial for irregularities, similar to a modern mistrial); HOLDSWORTH,
supra note 72, at 559 (discussing use of precise, technical rules of pleading to quash indictments for technical
flaws); Langbein, Eve, supra note 75, at 35 (discussing directed verdicts); Lester B. Orfield, History of Criminal
Appeal in England, 1 MO. L. REV. 326, 328 (1936) (noting that judges could grant new trials in misdemeanor
cases "for errors in the admission or exclusion of evidence ... or where it appeared that a new trial would
further the ends of justice"); id. at 329-30 (discussing defendant's demurrer to evidence as a way to withdraw a
case from the jury). But see id. at 328 (asserting that special verdicts were little used in criminal cases).
78. Sam B. Warner & Henry B. Cabot, Changes in the Administration of Criminal Justice During the
Past Fifty Years, 50 HARV. L. REV. 583, 587 (1937).
79. Sentencing is an integral part of the trial process in civil law countries, not a separate proceeding. In
addition, because the sentence is an integral part of the verdict, appeal and review of sentences function
identically to appeal and review of other factual or legal issues. Frederic R. Coudert, French Criminal
Procedure, 19 YALE L.J. 326, 336-37 (1910). Thus, a comparison of civil law approaches on these topics is
covered in Part III.B.
80. See, e.g., John H. Langbein, Shaping the Eighteenth-Century Criminal Trial: A View from the Ryder
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American Revolution to eliminate capital punishment for defendants who
ostensibly could read.8 Benefit of clergy also existed in the eighteenth-century
American colonies.82 In the United States, although Congress prohibited benefit
of clergy for federal statutory crimes in 1790,"3 it still existed in many states at
the time the Sixth Amendment was ratified"M and continued as an institution in
some states until after the Civil War.
85
Another practice used to avoid harsh mandatory sentences was to suspend
their imposition. Although judges in England and the early United States lacked
power to suspend a sentence for leniency, they could do so to allow defendants to
take various procedural steps.86 Such delays were common until the end of the
eighteenth century, 7 and a suspension could go on indefinitely." In addition,
although they lacked formal power to do so, some judges in the American
colonies suspended sentences to allow for rehabilitation. 9 Eventually this
Sources, 50 U. CHI. L. REV. 1, 37-41 (1983) (indicating that those eligible for the benefit were given alternative
sentences to death).
81. Little, supra note 73, at 365. The benefit of clergy dates from well before the fourteenth century in
England. At first it benefited only clergymen. Eventually it was extended to anyone who actually could read. In
England it ultimately became available to anyone who could pretend to read by memorizing the standard psalter
verse judges used to "test" literacy; where even memorization did not work, judges might help prisoners read
the passage. See generally, e.g., Baker, supra note 72, at 41; BAKER, supra note 75, at 586-88; SIR WILLIAM
BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND VOL IV at ch. 28; HOLDSWORTH, supra note 77, at
561-62; Langbein, supra note 81, at 37-41. In 1706, in response to the fictionalization of the benefit, Parliament
abolished the reading test and extended the benefit to the "invincibly illiterate." Baker, supra note 72, at 41.
English judges continued to have the power to confer the benefit until 1837. BAKER, supra note 75, at 589.
82. WHITMAN, supra note 75, at 169.
83. Act of April 30, 1790, § 31, 1 Stat. 112, 119 ("[T]he benefit of clergy shall not be used or allowed,
upon conviction of any crime, for which, by any statute of the United States, the punishment is or shall be
declared to be death.").
84. GEORGE W. DALZELL, BENEFIT OF CLERGY IN AMERICA AND RELATED MATrERS (1955). Dalzell
reports that the benefit was abolished in Virginia in 1796 (id. at 248-50); Kentucky in 1800 (id. at 251-52);
Maryland in 1810 (id. at 252); Delaware in 1826 (id. at 253); Pennslyvania in 1794 (id. at 253); New Jersey in
1796 (id. at 253); Rhode Island in 1798 (id. at 256); and Georgia in 1834 (id. at 268). (However, the book is not
conventionally notated due to the author's death before it was completed.)
85. Id. at 257-66 (discussing North Carolina and South Carolina). The institution died out in the United
States when penitentiaries took the place of the death penalty for most crimes. Id. at 248-68.
86. Baker, supra note 72, at 40; James D. Barnett, Executive, Legislature, and Judiciary in Pardon, 49
AM. L. REV. 684, 705-09 (1915) (labeling practices that occurred before conviction as "judicial pardons");
BLACKSTONE, supra note 81, at ch. 31 (noting that the device was used "as where the judge is not satisfied with
the verdict, or the evidence is suspicious, or the indictment is insufficient, or he is doubtful whether the offense
be within clergy; or sometimes if it be a small felony, or any favorable circumstances appear in the criminal's
character, in order to give room to apply to the crown for either an absolute or conditional pardon"); Warner &
Cabot, supra note 78, at 598 ("It became settled doctrine that neither the English nor the colonial courts had
common law power to suspend sentence in order to give the defendant a chance to mend his ways" although
courts could suspend sentence briefly "to permit a new trial or the exercise of some other legal right .... ).
87. Baker, supra note 72, at 41. In the late eighteenth century, judges began the practice of imposing
judgment immediately. Id.
88. Barnett, supra note 86, at 709-13; Orfield, supra note 77, at 331.
89. Warner & Cabot, supra note 78, at 598 (noting that in the first half of the seventeenth-century courts
in the Massachusetts colony could suspend imposition and execution of sentence and occasionally did so,
sometimes "in connection with probation"); id. at 598-99 (noting examples of probation in first half of the
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practice became legitimate: by the late 1840s judges in Boston could suspend
sentences in the context of a supervised probation system. 90 Acceptance of
judicial power to suspend sentences grew over the course of the nineteenth
century. 9' By the middle of the twentieth century, suspended sentences combined
with probation were commonplace in the United States.92
The last mechanism of interest is the executive pardon, which at first does
not appear to involve discretionary judicial power. However, pardons once
functioned quite differently than they do today. Historically in England, although
the King formally granted the pardon,93 "he invariably deferred to thereco mendtionof te tral " ,94
recommendation of the trial judge, who acted "because of doubts as to the
propriety of the conviction, on the recommendation of the jury, or because of
influence ... Indeed, "the process of granting pardons had come under the
routine control of trial judges, who reported at the end of every circuit to the
secretary of state with their recommendations for mercy. 96 In addition, judges
had "wide discretion" to grant formal reprieves in situations in which they had
"recommended or otherwise expected that the convict should receive a pardon." 97
By the time the Sixth Amendment was adopted in the United States, this system
was widespread in England. 9
Given the prominence of pardons in England, it is no surprise that they also
played a big role in British America. Pardons were very common in the colonial99
era and were an accepted part of the criminal justice system in the
nineteenth ccntury); see also STITH & CABRANES, supra note 19, at II (stating that even with mandatory
minimums, federal judges had discretion to suspend prison or delay imposition of sentence). But see Lardner &
Love, supra note 73, at 212 (asserting that it is clear from the pardon files that federal judges in the first half of
the nineteenth century did not believe they possessed the power to remit a fine or suspend a sentence for
anything but a short period of time, pending a clemency request for example).
90. Warner & Cabot, supra note 78, at 599.
91. See AUSTIN ABBOTT, A BRIEF FOR THE TRIAL OF CRIMINAL CASES § 861, at 24 (1892) (indicating
that states gave judges the power to suspend sentences "in their discretion when the interests of justice appear to
demand it"); Warner & Cabot, supra note 78, at 599 (noting supervised probation systems or the equivalent in
Baltimore (1894), Minnesota (1897), Vermont (1898), and Rhode Island (1899)).
92. Rothman, supra note 73, at 640-41.
93. The power of the King to issue pardons goes back to Anglo-Saxon times (i.e. before 1066).
BLACKSTONE, supra note 81, at ch. 31 (outlining statutory limitations on pardons and technicalities associated
with their use). See generally BAKER, supra note 75, at 589-90; Orfield, supra note 77, at 331, 335.
94. Langbein, Eve, supra note 75, at 36.
95. Baker, supra note 72, at 44 (discussing unconditional pardons). Baker notes that judges could not
actually give pardons, as they required "the Great Seal on the authority of the secretary of state or the Privy
Council." Id.; see also BAKER, supra note 75, at 589-90 (noting that application for an unconditional pardon
was an informal appeal mechanism).
96. BAKER, supra note 75, at 589-90 ("[S]entences of death were pronounced in many instances where
there was no intention of carrying out the judgment.").
97. Baker, supra note 72, at 44.
98. WHITMAN, supra note 75, at 164 (noting that pardoning was widespread in eighteenth-century
England, was "'fully routinized' by the third quarter of the eighteenth, and continued to soften the impact of the
criminal law into the early nineteenth").
99. Id. at 169 (giving example of colonial New York between 1691 and 1776, where at least 51.7% of
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Revolutionary period and in the early years of the United States,' °° at both the
federal' °' and state levels.' 2 As English judges had done, American judges faced
with mandatory penalties that seemed unjust sought executive pardons as a way
to get relief for defendants.' 3 Federal judges, for example, often recommended
pardons and even lobbied the President to grant them, °' and the executive branch
frequently asked sentencing judges for their opinions on pardon petitions.'05
Nineteenth-century Presidents often, although not inevitably, acceded to the
petitions.'" Commentators have concluded that pardons-in which discretionary
judicial input played a prominent role-introduced a needed safety-valve into an
otherwise rigid system.' 7 However, at least at the federal level, the situation had
changed by the middle of the twentieth century. While political pardons
continued, 00 the rate of other pardons dropped sharply as parole came to be used
to relieve the pressure of long prison terms. '09
accused offenders received pardons after trial and noting that "[c]olonial officials were ... besieged by pardon
petitions"). Whitman further notes that although many people who received pardons were probably of high
status, officials also pardoned those for whom guilt was in doubt, youths, offenders who would enroll in
military service, and slaves (at the behest of their masters). Id.
100. Id. at 181-82.
101. See, e.g., U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 1. (granting the President of the United States the power to
issue pardons); WHITMAN, supra note 75, at 182 (noting that Washington used the power first to pardon
participants in the Whiskey Rebellion and that many other eighteenth-century pardons were similarly political);
id. at 169 (noting that as in England, pardons were not reserved for high-status defendants).
102. Whitman notes that eight of the thirteen colonies took power away from govemors and placed in
executive councils but that by 1790 the states had begun to return the power to governors. WHITMAN, supra
note 75, at 181-82.
103. Lardner & Love, supra note 73, at 217 ("Criminal procedure in the early days of the Republic
offered judges only a limited opportunity to set aside jury verdicts or grant a new trial ... [and so] it appears to
have been easier for judges to take a sympathetic case to the president with a recommendation for clemency
than to resort to the rigid machinery ofjustice.").
104. See generally id.
105. Id. at 212-13 (noting that this practice began in the Jefferson administration).
106. See id. at 213 n.20 (reporting statistics); WHITMAN, supra note 75, at 183 (noting that pardoning
was in the nineteenth century as many as 43% of federal prisoners were pardoned).
107. Lardner & Love, supra note 73, at 218 (noting that because of the pardon system, despite its
surface rigidity, "the federal justice system in the early 19th century... was usually able to reach a result
corresponding to the moral judgment of the community, as the Framers of the Constitution intended"). The use
of pardons as a safety valve may have been especially true in capital cases. Little, supra note 73, at 366 ("In
1829, the President reported that in the Nation's first thirty-six years, there had been 138 federal capital trials,
yielding 118 convictions. Of these, forty-two offenders had been executed and sixty-four had been pardoned.").
However, federal judges, at least, also urged intervention in cases involving mandatory fines and prison terms.
See, e.g., Lardner & Love, supra note 73, at 216-17 (highlighting cases involving employee mail theft).
108. Presidents continued to issue political pardons well into the Ford and Carter administrations.
WHITMAN, supra note 75, at 182 (noting that Ford pardoned Nixon, and Carter pardoned draft evaders).
109. Id. at 183 (noting, however, that Presidents continued to issue large numbers of ordinary pardons well
into the twentieth century). For statistics on presidential pardons, commutations, and remissions of fines from
President Truman through President G. W. Bush, see United States Department of Justice, Presidential Clemency
Actions by Administration: 1945 to Present, http://www.usdoj.gov:80/pardonL/actions_ administration.htm (on file
with the McGeorge Law Review).
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This brief review has noted a number of mechanisms, traditional in the
common law criminal system, to get around ostensibly mandatory sentences that
seemed harsh in individual cases. Importantly, only one of these mechanisms
resided with the jury while the others were judicial in nature. Combined, these
tools allowed the trial court as a unit to avoid the mandates of the law when
justice so required. With the rise of indeterminate sentencing in the twentieth
century, broad discretion allowed judges to individualize justice as a matter of
course. The sentencing decision became the focus for individualized justice in
punishment, and the mechanisms that had been vital under mandatory sentencing
atrophied. As a result, when legislatures abolished indeterminate sentencing, little
discretion to individualize punishment remained.
B. Discretionary versus Uniform Justice: A Comparison with the Civil Law
Tradition
1. Why Comparative Law is Relevant
The sentencing cases represent a dramatic affirmation of the jury trial system
in criminal procedure. The Court disallowed sentencing schemes that threatened
the right to jury trial by shifting to a judge the power to find facts determining the
maximum allowable sentence. These schemes made sentencing more efficient
and furthered predictability and uniformity of outcome. However, although these
advantages did not make a constitutional difference, they did play a role in the
Court's deliberations.
The point emerged most strongly in a debate between Justices Scalia and
Breyer that began in Apprendi. Justice Breyer, supporting a structured system,
rejected the notion of jury sentencing, seeing it as a "procedural ideal ... [that]
the real world of criminal justice cannot hope to meet. ... "0 Judicial
sentencing, on the other hand, fulfills the real world's "administrative need for
procedural compromise."'' . Justice Scalia retorted that Breyer's system would be
a "bureaucratic realm of perfect equity," one "designed for a society that is
prepared to leave criminal justice to the State . . . [but rejected by the] founders
,, , ,2of the American Republic [who] were not prepared to leave it to the State ....
Developing this point further in Blakely, Scalia admitted that "leaving justice
entirely in the hands of professionals" might be more efficient and fair,"3 but
concluded that those values are not decisive.
110. Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 555 (2000) (Breyer, J., dissenting).
11. Id. at 556-57 (emphasis in original).
112. Id. at 498 (Scalia, J., concurring).
113. It is debatable whether civil law systems, at least as practiced today, are more efficient than those
of the common law tradition. For example, the common law system that developed in Germany was inefficient,
which caused adoption of civil law type mechanisms such as plea bargaining. See, e.g., Jenia Iontcheva Turner,
Judicial Participation in Plea Negotiations: A Comparative View, 54 AM. J. CoMP. L. 199, 226 (2006). On the
other hand, the criminal justice system appears to have become less efficient when Italy adopted common law
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[M]any nations of the world, particularly those following the civil law
traditions, [leave justice entirely in the hands of professionals]. There is
not one shred of doubt, however, about the Framers' paradigm for
criminal justice: not the civil law ideal of administrative perfection, but
the common law ideal of limited state power accomplished by the strict
division of authority between judge and jury."4
A notable aspect of this exchange-and of the sentencing cases generally-is
that the Court does not compare the precise sentencing practices used in the
United States and elsewhere at the time the Sixth Amendment was adopted.
Instead, the Court evaluates the challenged sentencing schemes against the
backdrop of the common law tradition generally."' As noted by Justice Scalia,
this tradition contrasts with the civil law paradigm. The Court does not want
sentencing to mirror the precise procedures in place when the Sixth Amendment
was adopted. Its concern is to prevent our criminal justice system from sliding
into the civil law mold.
For this reason, it is important to view the structured sentencing schemes in
the context of the broad traditions of common law versus civil law. In this regard,
we must acknowledge that jury trials have not been entirely absent from the civil
law world. It is true that Continental systems did not use juries at the time the
Sixth Amendment was adopted. ' 6 However, even before the American
Revolution, many people in France wanted to emulate the British jury trial in
criminal cases," 7 and France adopted jury trials after its own revolution."'
Germany also has a tradition of involving ordinary citizens in judging some
criminal cases." 9 What is important is not whether a criminal justice system
involves juries in some manner. On the contrary, it is the way the two traditions
use juries and judges that makes the difference. Thus, the autonomy enjoyed by
juries in the common law tradition must be viewed as part of a broader dynamic
system in which judges have also enjoyed significant independence from the
mechanisms. E.g., Rachel A. Van Cleave, An Offer You Can't Refuse? Punishment Without Trial in Italy and
the United States: The Search for Truth and an Efficient Criminal Justice System, 11 EMORY INT'L L. REv. 419
(1997).
114. Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. 296, 313 (2004).
115. This general approach is reflected in Justice Scalia's focus on "paradigms" and "traditions" and in
his use of the present tense. See id.
116. E.g., Roderick Munday, Jury Trial, Continental Style, 13 LEGAL STUDIES 204, 206 (1993).
117. See, e.g., id. ("[T]he English jury had been vaunted by Montesquieu . . . and was further
popularized amongst lawyers and intellectuals before and after the Revolution ... .
118. See infra notes 136-41.
119. See. e.g., THE TRIAL JURY IN ENGLAND, FRANCE, GERMANY 1700-1900 (1987); Gerhard Casper &
Hans Zeisel, Lay Judges in the German Criminal Courts, I J. LEGAL STUD. 135 (1972). C.f Carmen Gleadow,
Spain's Return to Trial by Jury: Theoretical Foundations and Practical Results, 2001-2002 ST. LOUIS-
WARSAw TRANSATLANTIC L.J. 57, 60 (2001-2002) (indicating that jury trial existed in some criminal cases in
Spain beginning in 1820).
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legislative and executive branches of government. However, as this section will
explore, such independence has not been the case for civil law judges.
Of course, common law and civil law systems also differ importantly in their
approaches to the investigation of crime' 20 and in the amount of control the
parties have over the proceedings. '2 However, these are not the dimensions that
are most relevant to whether common law judges function as circuitbreakers to
moderate legislative mandates. 22 To explore that issue we need to focus on
differences in the amount of autonomy given to trial level decision-makers in
developing and applying the law.
Thus, this section will examine how the two systems differ in tolerating
criminal trial court independence.' 23  Subsection 2 will review trial court
discretion in fact finding. Subsection 3 will look at judicial independence in
matters of law, and Subsection 4 will examine judicial role expectations. This
survey will reveal that in the civil law tradition trial level decision-makers have
little, if any, autonomy in developing or applying the law. On the other hand, the
common law model assumes that the criminal trial court-the judge, the jury, or
120. See generally, e.g., Craig M. Bradley, The Exclusionary Rule in Germany, 96 HARV. L. REV. 1032
(1983); Kuk Cho, "Procedural Weakness" of German Criminal Justice and Its Unique Exclusionary Rules
Based on the Right of Personality, 15 TEMP. INT'L & COMP. L.J. 1 (2001); Hon. Gene D. Cohen, Comparing the
Investigating Grand Jury with the French System of Criminal Investigations: A Judge's Perspective and
Commentary, 13 TEMP. INT'L & COMP. L.J. 87 (1999); Mirjan Damalka, Evidentiary Barriers to Conviction
and Two Models of Criminal Procedure: A Comparative Study, 121 U. PA. L. REV. 506 (1973); Stewart Field &
Andrew West, A Tale of Two Reforms: French Defense Rights and Police Powers in Transition, 6 CRIM. L.F.
473 (1995); Walter Pakter, Exclusionary Rules in France, Germany, and Italy, 9 HASTINGS INT'L. & COMP. L.
REV. 1 (1985); Barry F. Shanks, Comparative Analysis of the Exclusionary Rule and Its Alternatives, 57 TUL. L.
REV. 648 (1983); Stephen C. Thaman, Miranda in Comparative Law, 45 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 581 (2001); Edward
A. Tomlinson, The Saga of Wiretapping in France: What It Tells Us About the French Criminal Justice System,
53 LA. L. REV. 1091 (1993); Gordon Van Kessel, European Perspectives on the Accused as a Source of
Testimonial Evidence, 100 W. VA. L. REV. 799 (1998).
121. This difference has contributed to the common use of the labels "inquisitorial" and "adversarial."
E.g., Md.ximo Langer, From Legal Transplants to Legal Translations: The Globalization of Plea Bargaining
and the Americanization Thesis in Criminal Procedure, 45 HARV. INT'L L.J. 1, 3 (2004) [hereinafter Langer,
Transplants]; Langer, Plea Bargaining, supra note 46, at 226; William T. Pizzi & Mariangela Montagna, The
Battle to Establish an Adversarial Trial System in Italy, 25 MICH. J. INT'L L. 429, 430 (2004). William Pizzi has
focused on the issue of judge versus party control and observes that the sentencing phase of trials in the United
States is more inquisitorial than adversarial. See Pizzi, supra note 10, at 23-29. However, as this article
suggests, the division of labor between the parties is not the only, or even best, focus of the comparison.
122. An examination of whether criminal trial courts also mitigate overreaching by prosecutors is
beyond the scope of this article. However, it might be noted that in the common law tradition trial judges and
prosecutors have, from time to time, collaborated in resisting legislative mandates. Lardner & Love, supra note
73, at 212-14. On the other hand, in some civil law systems such as France, prosecutors and judges are part of
the same government bureaucracy. See, e.g., John D. Jackson, The Effect of Legal Culture and Proof in
Decisions to Prosecute, 3 LAW, PROBABILITY & RISK 109, 113 (2004); Ren~e Lettow Lerner, The Intersection
of Two Systems: An American on Trial for an American Murder in the French Cour dAssises, 2001 U. ILL. L.
REV. 791, 809 (2001); William Savitt, Note, Villainous Verdicts? Rethinking the Nineteenth-Century French
Jury, 96 COLUM. L. REV. 1019, 1019 n.6 (1996).
123. For heuristic models contrasting the common law and civil law traditions, see generally, for
example, Mirjan Damaika, supra note 120; Mirjan Damalka, Structures of Authority and Comparative
Criminal Procedure, 84 YALE L.J. 480 (1985) [hereinafter Damalka, Structures]; Langer, Transplants, supra
note 121.
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a combination of the two-will have considerable independence in both areas.
The striking autonomy of common law trial courts allows them to function as a
structural "circuitbreaker in the State's machinery of justice"'24 that can mitigate
any harshness or overreaching on the part of the legislature. By rejecting such
autonomy, the civil law systems have declined to use trial courts in this manner.
The difference in trial judge autonomy seen in the two traditions is relevant to the
Supreme Court's sentencing cases. By severely restricting the trial judge's
sentencing discretion, structured sentencing schemes moved out of the common
law and into the civil law mold.
It is beyond the scope of this article to review every variation of the common
law and civil law traditions. Our look at the common law will focus on England,
where it was first developed, and on the United States, the source of the problem
under examination. Our look at the civil law tradition will focus on the modem
French system established under Napoleon,'25 because it has provided the
prototype for systems in the other civil law countries"' and has changed little
since the early nineteenth century.12 7
2. Trial Court Discretion in Fact Finding
Control of fact finding is crucial to trial court independence: trial courts that
are free to find the facts as they please can avoid legislative mandates by
concluding that the proof is insufficient for conviction. In this regard, the
common law and civil law traditions differ significantly. The common law
tradition embraces the notion of truly independent lay fact finders; based on this
model, it has crafted a trial court system that allows trial judges to be equally
independent when juries are waived. The civil law tradition, on the other hand,
only grudgingly uses lay fact finders and controls them narrowly. It also ensures
that judicial fact finding does not frustrate legislative mandates.
As noted earlier, juries in common law countries have the power of
nullification; the power to acquit against the evidence.'28 Juries have this power
because they return a general verdict-guilty or not guilty-that need not be
explained; indeed, a verdict of acquittal cannot be reversed on appeal." 9 The use
124. Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. 296, 306 (2004).
125. The system was embodied in the Code d'instruction criminelle (Code of Criminal Procedure)
(1808) and the Code pinal (Criminal Code) (1810), which took effect at the same time in January, 1811. Savitt,
supra note 122, at 1031.
126. See A. ESMEIN, HISTORY OF CONTINENTAL CRIMINAL PROCEDURE WITH SPECIAL REFERENCE TO
FRANCE 571 (1913) (noting that the Napoleonic era codes served as a model for other Continental systems).
127. The Napoleonic-era codes "functioned as the cornerstones of French criminal justice until well
after World War HI." Savitt, supra note 122, at 1031. The French replaced the Procedural Code in 1958 and the
Penal Code in 1994. Richard S. Frase, Introduction, THE FRENCH CODE OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE, REVISED
ED. 2-3 (1988); Savitt, supra note 122, at 1031 n.76.
128. See supra note 75.
129. See, e.g., Barkow, supra note 8, at 36-37 (discussing the jury's "safety-valve" function); Matthew
P. Harrington, The Law-Finding Function of the American Jury, 1999 WIS. L. REV. 377, 385-86 (1999); Colleen
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of the general verdict in criminal cases is deeply rooted in the common law,
where it has been viewed as a bulwark against government control of juries.30
The right to jury trial was an important issue at the time of the American
Revolution,' and it was incorporated into the constitutions of all of the original
states.132 It continues to be the norm in criminal cases in England, the United
States, and other common law countries, despite occasional criticism and
suggestions for change.' The right to a jury trial, with all that it implies
regarding potential nullification of legislative mandates, "is fundamental to the
American scheme of justice"'' 34 and is thus required to be available to all
defendants charged with non-petty crimes.1
31
France, on the other hand, made limited use of lay fact finders and gave them
less power than common law juries. France adopted the jury system in criminal
cases after the French Revolution in an unabashed imitation of the English
model. 3 6 In the ensuing years, some observers became disillusioned with juries,
but the institution of jury trial survived the Napoleonic reforms.'37 Nevertheless,
the jury's power was restricted in a number of ways. These included the inability
to return a general verdict,' 31 the absence of a unanimity requirement,'39 and a
P. Murphy, Integrating the Constitutional Authority of Civil and Criminal Juries, 61 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 723,
769-70 (1993) (discussing the American criminal jury's "absolute authority to acquit"); see also infra note 156.
130. See, e.g., Harrington, supra note 129, at 385-86; Murphy, supra note 129, at 770; see also Duncan
v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 155-56 (1968) (discussing jury trial generally as a protection against government
oppression). Cf Langbein, Eve, supra note 75, at 36 (noting that historically English judges might pressure
juries to reconsider guilty verdicts with which they disagreed and that juries rarely convicted against the will of
the judge, as they knew judges would merely seek pardons).
131. Duncan, 391 U.S. at 152-53.
132. Id. at 153.
133. See, e.g., Nancy J. King, Silencing Nullification Advocacy Inside the Jury Room and Outside the
Courtroom, 65 U. CHI. L. REV. 433, 435-38 (1998) (discussing the various methods prosecutors and judges use
to prevent nullification and concluding that they are constitutional). For a more in-depth discussion of jury
nullification, see supra notes 73-74.
134. Duncan, 391 U.S. at 149.
135. Id. at 156-61 (indicating that crimes carrying up to six months incarceration, for example, need not
be tried to a jury "if they otherwise qualify as petty offenses").
136. See, e.g., Langbein, supra note 72, at 13; Munday, supra note 116, at 205-06.
137. E.g., ESMEIN, supra note 126, at 495-98; Munday, supra note 136, at 207-08; Morris Ploscowe,
Development of Inquisitorial and Accusatorial Elements in French Procedure, 23 AM. INST. CRIM. L. &
CRIMINOLOGY 372, 389 (1932); Savitt, supra note 122, at 1031.
138. E.g., Ploscowe, supra note 137, at 390-91 (comparing the French practice to special verdicts).
Following the French Revolution, the Code of 1791 instituted a verdict consisting of a series of yes-no
questions, posed by the presiding judge, covering all major issues in the case. See, e.g., ESMEIN, supra note 126,
at 416; Ploscowe, supra note 137, at 390; Savitt, supra note 122, at 1025. This approach was retained in
modified form in the Napoleonic Code d'Instruction Criminelle of 1808. See, e.g., Savitt, supra note 122, at
1031-34. It still exists in the French Code of Criminal Procedure today. CODE DE PROCIDURE PINAL [C. PR.
PEN.] art. 348 (Fr.). In a complex case, these questions can be quite detailed. The president must pose the
"principal question"-"'Is the accused guilty of having committed the act'-as to "each act specified in the
body of the decree of remand." Id. art. 349 [1] & [2]. In addition, Art. 349 requires the court to pose a separate
question as to each "aggravating circumstance" and, if appropriate, "each excuse invoked." Art. 350 makes this
true for both aggravating circumstances that appear in the decree of remand and those that "appear during the
trial." Finally, Art. 351 requires the president to pose questions as to "legal qualifications" that arise during trial.
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structure that allowed professional judges to intimidate jurors and even overrule
jury decisions. '4° Indeed, the "French rules [were] too obviously directed towards
obtaining a pliant tribunal of fact,"' 4' not a fact-finding body that could protect
citizens from government overreaching. In addition, this weak form of jury trial
was available only for cases tried in the cour d'assises,4 and beginning in the
early nineteenth century, distrust of juries led judges, prosecutors, and
legislatures to bring about a "deliberate and progressive reduction of the range of
offenses that are subject to the jurisdiction" of that court.' 3 The preceding
discussion has revealed that the common law jury had more power than the
French jury to thwart legislative mandates regarding criminality. However, more
importantly for the theme of this article, perhaps, is the fact that common law
trial judges also had more fact-finding independence than the judges in French
trial courts. The role of judicial fact finders is crucial in France, as most cases are
tried by judges alone,'" a practice that goes as far back as the seventeenth
century.' 4' As far back as the seventeenth century, French judges were restricted
in their fact finding by the system of legal proof. 46 Even today, judges lack
139. E.g., Munday, supra note 136, at 208-09; Ploscowe, supra note 137, at 390.
140. E.g., ESMEIN, supra note 126, at 513-14; Munday, supra note 136, at 208-09; Ploscowe, supra note
137, at 387-90; Savitt, supra note 122, at 1031-33. Even today in the French Cour d'Assizes, the President reads
in open court the questions required for the special verdict (C. PR. PlN. Arts. 348-51 (Fr.)), and the professional
and lay judges retire together to deliberate and reach the results. C. PR. PEN. Arts. 355-65 (Fr.); see also Val~rie
Dervieux et. al, The French System, in EUROPEAN CRIMINAL PROCEDURES 218, 231 (2002); Frase, supra note
127, at 25-26.
141. Munday, supra note 136, at 209. However, there is evidence that French juries in the early
nineteenth century also practiced nullification in the face of harsh mandatory punishments. Savitt, supra note
122, at 1024-30, 1035-36 (reviewing nineteenth-century concerns); id. at 1037-39 (reviewing historical
commentary on the subject); Edward A. Tomlinson, Introduction, in THE FRENCH PENAL CODE OF 1994, at 9
(Edward A. Tomlinson trans., F.B. Rothman 1999) (indicating that mixed panels "often refused to convict when
they believed the mandatory punishment which followed was unconscionably harsh, given the defendant's
circumstances"). However, there is some reason to believe that in at least some cases lenient jury verdicts
reflected the state of the evidence, not acquittal against the evidence. Savitt, supra note 122, at 1044-46
(analyzing case files from the Crte d'Or Assizes between 1810 and 1865). Nevertheless, it is interesting to note
that in response to the perception or reality of nullification of harsh laws, in 1832 the French Parliament adopted
laws regarding mitigating circumstances. Id.
142. Munday, supra note 136, at 213-14.
143. Id.
144. The lowest trial-level court, which tries petty or summary offenses, is the tribunal de police,
consisting of a single professional judge. The next level, trying ddlits, is normally composed of three
professional judges. E.g., Dervieux, supra note 140, at 230. These two courts try the largest percentage of cases
in the criminal justice system. Frase, supra note 127, at 3.
145. Judicial determination of facts was the rule in France under the Ordinance of 1670. E.g., Ploscowe,
supra note 137, at 384-85 (noting, in addition, that under the Ordinance of 1670 the trial was secret and
conducted on the basis of a written dossier). This was also the procedure used for petty offenses, serious
misdemeanors, and minor felonies under the 1808 Napoleonic Code of Criminal Instruction. Id. at 385-86
(noting that contraventions were tried before one justice of the peace, while dilits were tried before a panel of
three judges).
146. E.g., Ploscowe, supra note 137, at 384-85 (describing the French trial system under the Ordinance
of 1670, which governed until the French Revolution). Ploscowe notes, "[i]f the dossier fulfilled the conditions
for a complete proof under the system of legal proof, then the Court was compelled to pronounce the
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discretion to find facts freely in that they are required to explain in detail what
factual issues arose, how they were resolved, and what support for the resolution
exists in the record. 47 In addition, except in the lowest court, French trial judges
sit in panels,18 a dynamic that discourages creativity in fact finding. For example,
even if a trial judge felt inclined to skew the facts a certain way149 to avoid
conviction for a crime with a harsh sentence, these structural devices would make
such behavior difficult.
Bench trials are less common in the United States, as virtually all criminal
defendants can have jury trials.'5 ° Nevertheless, defendants who waive that right
and try their cases to a judge.'. continue to encounter a factfinder with substantial
autonomy. Thus, similar to juries, judges have substantial freedom as fact
finders. Judges in criminal trials sit alone, as opposed to in panels,'5 2 use general
verdicts, and have broad discretion as to what types of explanations to give in
support of their decisions.
The final difference in the independence of fact finders between the two
traditions involves review of the verdict, in particular a verdict of acquittal. As is
true in the civil law tradition generally, France utilizes true appeals in the sense
of de novo review of both the factual record and legal conclusions with a possible
substitution of a different verdict.' Such appeals have long been available for all
conviction, no matter what its personal appraisal of the value of the evidence might have been." Id. at 385.
147. In most countries this involves submitting a "justified" decision that follows a systematized
template. See generally Mirjan Damagka, Of Hearsay and Its Analogues, 76 MINN. L. REV. 425, 448-49 (1992)
(discussing "the requirement that continental judges specify their factual findings and justify their reliance on
particular informational sources in reasoned opinions"). Damaika notes that there is some resistance to the
notion of justified verdicts in France resulting from the survival of revolutionary ideals. Id. at 448-49. However,
candidates for French judgeships are tested on, among other things, how they draft decisions. Luis Mufiiz-
Argielles & Migdalia Fraticelli-Torres, Selection and Training of Judges in Spain, France, West Germany, and
England, 8 B.C. INT'L & COMP. L. REV. 1, 20 (1985); see also, e.g., William T. Pizzi & Walter Perron, Crime
Victims in German Courtrooms: A Comparative Perspective on American Problems, 32 STAN. J. INT'L L. 37,
49-51 (1996) (discussing German trial requirement that verdicts be explained and justified). Cf Jean Louis
Goutal, Characteristics of Judicial Style in France, Britain and the U.S.A., 24 AM. J. COMP. L. 43 (1976)
(discussing appellate opinions); F.H. Lawson, Comparative Judicial Style, 25 AM. J. COMP. L. 364, 366 (1977)
(commenting on Goutal).
148. See Dervieux, supra note 140, at 230.
149. French judges are unlikely to feel so inclined, however. See infra Part llI.B.4.
150. See supra note 135.
151. In the late 1990s, something in the neighborhood of five percent of criminal defendants had bench
trials compared to fewer than four percent who had jury trials and ninety-one percent who pleaded guilty.
Stephanos Bibas, Judicial Fact-finding and Sentence Enhancements in a World of Guilty Pleas, 110 YALE L.J.
1097, 1150 (2001).
152. Langbein, Eve, supra note 75, at 18 (noting that this was historically the case in England).
153. Technically, appeal means a de novo review of both the facts and the law of the case, where the
second court completely substitutes its views for that of the first court. J. A. Jolowicz, Appeal and Review in
Comparative Law: Similarities, Differences and Purposes, 15 MELB. U. L. REV. 618, 619-20 (1986). Although
appeal "serves the 'private' interests of the parties to the litigation in the actual outcome of their case" as
opposed to a societal interest in uniformity of the law (id. at 620), it is logical to assume that higher courts with
appeal powers can better ensure that trial courts obey legislative mandates, as they can counter both creative
lawmaking and nullifying fact finding.
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petty offenses and misdemeanors, at the behest of either party and as a matter of
right,'- and France now makes them available even for the most serious
offenses.'5 In the common law tradition, on the other hand, the prosecution
cannot request a higher court to review an acquittal on the merits, whether it was
handed down by a jury or a judge.156 While defendants have occasionally had the
right to request a de novo trial, this practice has been a footnote to the common
law system."7 The bottom line is that true appeals, "through which a higher court
reviews the entire case developed at the trial level and has the power to render a
judgment based on an overall assessment of the quality of the verdict, [are] not a
focal part of the common law tradition."'58
As noted above, one way a trial court can avoid legislative mandates is to
conclude that the facts do not fall within them. In this regard, common law trial
courts have much more discretion than do their civil law counterparts. Juries are
given broad discretion to acquit against the facts. Furthermore, when judges act
as fact finders, they have equally broad discretion. Finally, acquittals on the
merits cannot be reversed on appeal, and de novo reconsideration of convictions
154. E.g., Coudert, supra note 79, at 336-37; Frase, supra note 127, at 36-37; Jeremiah E. Goulka, The
First Constitutional Right to Criminal Appeal: Louisiana's Constitution of 1845 and the Clash of the Common
Law and Natural Law Traditions, 17 TUL. EUR. & Civ. L.F. 151, 170 (2002); Jacques Patey, Recent Reforms in
French Criminal Law and Procedure, 9 INT'L & COMP. L.Q. 383, 385-86 (1960).
155. Since 2000, however, the losing party at the cour d'assises has an appeal on the merits to a "cour
d'assises from a different area, composed of three professional judges and twelve jurors." Dervieux, supra note
140, at 232.
156. See Langbein, Eve, supra note 75, at 37 (noting that by "the later eighteenth century the rule was
already ancient that no appeal lay to reverse a verdict of acquittal). In the United States, this bar comes from
double jeopardy protections. U.S. CONST. amend. V. See generally, e.g., Forrest G. Alogna, Note, Double
Jeopardy, Acquittal Appeals, and the Law-Fact Distinction, 86 CORNELL L. REV. 1131, 1132-33 (2001).
157. Review of convictions "played an inconsequential role in English criminal procedure until well into
the nineteenth century." Langbein, Eve, supra note 75, at 37-38. In the United States, on the other hand, even in
the early years a number of jurisdictions provided a statutory right to de novo trials in misdemeanors. See, e.g.,
David Rossman, "Were There No Appeal": The History of Review in American Criminal Courts, 81 J. CRIM. L.
& CRIMINOLOGY 518, 528 (1990) (noting that in the Revolutionary era United States, "[a] number of states
allowed convicted defendants to appeal their cases and to receive trials de novo at a higher level in the court
system"); id. at 539 ("All of the New England states as well as North Carolina provided defendants convicted
before a lower court the right to obtain this form of review."). In Massachusetts, which established the model,
appeal to the next tier of the court system was available as a matter of right; a defendant who started at the
lowest rung might get a third de novo trial, with a completely new jury, before the Supreme Judicial Court. Id.
at 539-40. This right continues to exist by statute in some states today for minor crimes. E.g., OR.S. § 138.057.
158. Rossman, supra note 157, at 525; see also Orfield, supra note 77, at 327-28 (noting that attaint
(subjecting a jury's verdict to review by a second jury) was rarely used in criminal cases by the eighteenth
century). Note however, that the common law did have a mechanism through which an expanded trial court
could provide a completely new trial. In England, "new trials were permitted in misdemeanor cases tried by the
Court of King's Bench ... for errors in the admission or exclusion of evidence, or where it appeared that a new
trial would further the ends of justice." Id. at 328 (emphasis supplied) (noting that this was the case beginning in
1673). The defendant applied to the Kings Bench en banc as opposed to the trial judges, "thus giving the
proceedings somewhat of an appellate character." Id. at 329. The King's Bench continued to have the power to
grant new trials until it was abolished by the Criminal Appeal Act. Id. The Criminal Appeal Act was adopted in
1907. Id. at 336.
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is rare. The civil law model lies toward the opposite end of the spectrum in all
regards.
3. Judicial Independence in Matters of Law
The structure of the system affects legal decision-making by trial judges.5 9
How many opportunities does that structure create for a judge to exercise legal
independence and creativity? How broad is the opportunity for higher court
review of a trial court's legal decisions? A system with few opportunities for
legal creativity and a wide door to review tends to stifle or discourage legal
decision-making by trial courts. In this regard, common law judges have a
freedom to determine the law that is unknown in the civil law tradition.
It is important to note, however, that reality has long differed from the
models in both systems; the purity of the common law model has been altered by
an increase in legislation (including the existence of comprehensive codes). '60 In
civil law nations, the model is undermined by ad hoc amendments to codes and
other changes in the nature of legislation that increase the need for judicial gap-
filling. 6' Nevertheless, the traditional systems have developed-and judges and
practitioners have internalized-certain expectations about the role of judges in
creating law. This section will explore these differences in three contexts.
Subsection a. looks at the power of ordinary courts to interpret and invalidate
statutes. Subsection b. addresses the opportunities afforded trial judges to fill
holes in the coverage of penal legislation. Subsection c. covers the role played by
appellate courts to discourage or enable creativity in legal decision-making.
a. Power to Interpret and Invalidate Statutes
A comparison of trial courts in the two systems reveals one dramatic
difference in the capacity to affect the law. In the United States, even a judge in a
limited-jurisdiction municipal court can declare a legislative act
unconstitutional.162 This power may reflect a deeper tradition in which, even after
increased legislation reduced opportunities for judicial law creation, some legal
thinkers believed that judges had a residual common law power to refuse to give
159. There is some evidence that "both before the Framing and for a time thereafter, juries were
deciding questions of law." Barkow, supra note 8, at 66. See generally Harrington, supra note 129. However,
this type of legal decision-making is more properly evaluated in conjunction with jury nullification.
160. For example, "[a]s of 2003, forty states had adopted criminal codes based at least in part on the
Model Penal Code." Alice Ristroph, Desert, Democracy, and Sentencing Reform, 96 J. CRIM. L. &
CRIMINOLOGY 1293, 1305 n.36 (2006).
161. See generally, e.g., Mary Ann Glendon, The Sources of Law in a Changing Legal Order, 17
CREIGHTON L. REV. 663, 664-66, 672-76 (1984); Barbara Shapiro, Codification of the Laws in Seventeenth
Century England, 1974 Wis. L. REV. 428, 429 (1974).
162. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803).
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effect to statutes that violated the "law of nature."'63 In the civil law tradition, on
the other hand, no ordinary court, at any level, can declare an act of the
legislature unconstitutional. This power to invalidate statutes cannot help but
give trial court judges in the United States a sense of independence that carries
over to other activities such as statutory interpretation; conversely, the lack of
such power contributes to civil law judges' different perception of their role.
Of course, courts rarely declare statutes unconstitutional in the United
States,65 so the more important question involves the judicial power to interpret
legislation. Judges in all systems must engage in some interpretation, if only to
decide which of two possible statutes fits a given set of facts. Today the two
systems share many approaches to statutory interpretation, at least on the
surface.' 66 However, historical and philosophical 67 differences in the civil and
common law traditions affect how closely judges believe they must adhere to
statutory language. Not surprisingly, perhaps, civil law judges feel more
constrained to follow the letter of the law, while common law judges tend to see
themselves more as partners in the job of lawmaking. 68
Prior to 1791, judges had more discretionary power in France. For example,
all crimes were based on common law.169 Pressure for statutory law developed in
163. MORTON J. HORWrrz, THE TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN LAW, 1780-1860, at 16 (1977).
164. In France, that function is reserved for the Constitutional Council and is exercised during the
legislative process, outside the context of a particular case. See generally, e.g., Mufiiz-Argoelles & Fraticelli-
Torres, supra note 147, at 6-7; Roger Pinto, Elisabeth Zoller, Henri Ader, & Wallace Baker, A Primer on
French Constitutional Law and the French Court System, 5 TUL. J. INT'L & COMP. L. 365, 371-72 (1997). Even
this form of constitutional review was not added in France until 1958. Id. at 372. In some countries, however, a
constitutional question can be referred to the special council or constitutional court during the pendency of a
specific case using an interlocutory process. See, e.g., Antonio Baldassarre, Structure and Organization of the
Constitutional Court of Italy, 40 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 649 (1996); Daniel S. Dengler, Comment, The Italian
Constitutional Court: Safeguard of the Constitution, 19 DICK. J. INT'L L. 363, 370-71 (2001).
165. For example, "[slince Marbury v. Madison, over a 197 year span, 154 laws have been declared
unconstitutional." Leon Friedman, The Federalism Cases, 17 TOURO L. REV. 271,284 (2000). However, since 1994
the Supreme Court has dramatically increased the number of federal statutes it has declared unconstitutional. E.g.,
id. at 284-85; L.A. Powe, Jr., The Not-So-Brave New Constitutional Order, 117 HARV. L. REV. 647, 674 (2003)
(reviewing MARK TUSHNET, THE NEW CONSTITUTIONAL ORDER (2003)). Nevertheless, the number is still small.
For example, the Court declared approximately 29 statutes unconstitutional between 1994 and 2001. Id. at 674.
However, in that same time period Congress enacted over 1300 new laws, and that activity was not significantly
different from previous years. See The Library of Congress, http://thomas.loc.gov/bss/dll0/d1l0laws.html (last
visited May 24, 2008) (providing a forum to look up each law passed by Congress in any given year). For some
indication of the situation regarding Supreme Court invalidation of state statutes, see Frank B. Cross & Stefanie
Lindquist, Doctrinal and Strategic Influences of the Chief Justice, 154 U. PENN. L. REV. 1665, 1705 (2006).
166. See infra note 184.
167. See, e.g., Andrea Nollent, Legal Education in France and England: A Comparative Study, 36 LAW
TEACHER 277, 284-85 (2002) (contrasting French deductive with English inductive philosophies).
168. This partnership is well illustrated, in fact, by the Supreme Court's re-writing of the U.S.
Sentencing Guidelines to make them advisory in nature. See United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220, 246 (2006)
(admitting that the remedy adopted "significantly alter[s] the system that Congress designed").
169. Marc Ancel, Introduction, in THE FRENCH PENAL CODE 2 (Jean F. Moreau & Gerhard Ow.
Mueller trans., F.B. Rothman 1960) (noting that until the French Revolution "France had lived under the ancient
European Common Law of crimes").
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reaction to perceived judicial abuse of that system.'7° The French Penal Code of
1791 required judges "to apply the written legal provision without any discretion
at interpretation."' 7' As one commentator notes, "[t]he French Revolution adopted
measures to subjugate the judiciary.... French courts were even required to
address questions of interpretive doubt to the legislature, reflecting the ideology
that courts lacked any lawmaking discretion."'
72
In England, on the other hand, common law crimes and statutory crimes co-
existed for centuries, 7 1 with a tradition of a judicially active, even aggressive,
approach to statutory interpretation.'74 The predominant theory of natural law
supported the notion that both judges and legislatures were merely discovering
true legal principles that existed apart from either institution'7  and were thus
engaged in "a shared responsibility to determine the law.' 76
The American Revolution did not break this common law tradition. Although
there was ambivalence toward judicial authority to interpret statutes,171
170. Id.
171. Id.
172. WILLIAM D. POPKIN, STATUTES IN COURT 33-34 (Duke Univ. Press 1999).
173. See, e.g., Bruce P. Smith, Review Essay, English Criminal Justice Administration, 1650-1850: A
Historiographic Essay, 25 L. & HIST. REV. 593, 616 (2007) (discussing statutes regarding burglary and theft
dating from the sixteenth century).
174. POPKIN, supra note 172, at 18 (noting that in the sixteenth- and seventeenth-centuries "the judicial
role in statutory interpretation was broad and undifferentiated"). Sixteenth- and seventeenth-century judges used
their interpretive powers to protect the position of common law rules. Id. at 18-19 (noting that judge "viewed
the common law as the predominant and preeminent source of law [and understood statutes] in terms of their
relationship to that law"). Using an "equitable interpretation" theory, they attempted to mould statutes to their
"truest and best use." Id. at 16 (quoting language in judicial decision and adding emphasis); see also id. at II
("Courts could limit or expand the statute beyond what the letter appeared to say."); id. at 13-14 (giving
examples from the criminal law of "modest" "commonsensical" exceptions judges made to the broad scope of
some statutes and noting that judges could also expand the meaning of a text). In taking this approach, judges
felt free to depart from "what Parliament might have intended." Id. at 16. Parliament went along with this,
rarely objecting to judicial interpretations or even to a declaration that a statute was void based on some higher
principle. Id. at 18.
175. See, e.g., id. at 11 ("Judges came to think of statutes as both letter and spirit; and the 'spirit' was
referred to as the 'equity of the statute."'); id. at 11-12 (quoting Plowden, writing in 1574, in support of the
notion that the source of the "real" law is other than Parliament). Although in the eighteenth-century the rhetoric
shifted toward seeking legislative intent and sticking closer to the words of the statute (id. at 19), in practice,
judges "took only halting steps toward abandoning equitable interpretation... Id. at 28 (noting that
Blackstone's textualist approach was not shared by other commentators); see also id. at 19-22 (explaining why
the view of Blackstone as a textualist is "incomplete and inaccurate" anyway); id. at 26-27 (finding support in
Blackstone for judicial discretion); id. at 28-29 (noting that "[d]espite the textualist rhetoric and emphasis on
legislative sovereignty, courts continued to fit statutes (and common law precedent) into the broader legal
system, though there was undoubtedly a growing awareness that performing this role was a more vulnerable
pursuit than in the past"). Thus, "[b]y the time of the American Revolution, England had a long tradition of
statutory interpretation." Id. at 9; see also id. at 9-10 (tracing how legislating came to be separate from judging
in England).
176. Id. at 13 (observing that no modem doctrine of separation of powers limited this enterprise).
177. Id. at 31-32 (noting that in Revolutionary and post-Revolutionary United States, the popular
attitude toward judicial authority to interpret statutes was ambivalent). Support for legislatures and structural
efforts to hem in judicial power were counterbalanced by the equally heartfelt suspicion of legislatures; indeed,
in some areas of life (such as individual rights) people welcomed judicial discretion. Id. at 32-33. Statutory
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the American Revolution was not the French Revolution. . . . [T]he
French dichotomy between legislating and judging persisted with an
intensity foreign to the American tradition, which never completely lost
contact with the notion that both legislation and judge-made law were
derived from a common source."'
Thus, at the time the Constitution was adopted, judicial discretion was more
constrained than it had been in England, 9 but it was not prohibited by any clear
notion of separation of powers."" During the nineteenth century, although
legislatures were increasingly active in adopting statutes, "the practicing bar was
reluctant to accept legislation as a significant source of law."'' Bench and bar
resistance mounted, culminating in judicial hostility to legislation around the
time of the Civil War.' s2  Judges increasingly declared statutes to be
unconstitutional and engaged in "aggressive application of the canon that statutes
in derogation of the common law be narrowly construed."'8 3
Today, common law and civil law judges are probably more alike than they
used to be as regards freedom to interpret statutes.'84 Nevertheless, significant
differences remain. Common law judges have more latitude to interpret statutes
to deal with the problems raised by specific cases; civil law legal discourse, on
the other hand, tends to move on a more abstract level, aiming for broad logical
consistency while relying on "relatively rigid methods of analysis" and seeking
the one right solution to the problem at hand.'1
5
interpretation, per se, was not a big issue, and at best the role of judges was ambiguous. Id. at 34-35.
178. Id. at 33-34.
179. Id. at 44. Popkin notes the existence of pressure on judges "to be selective in the way that they
aggressively interacted with legislation in light of the reality of popular sovereignty and a growing sense of
legislative competence." Id. at 45.
180. Id. at 37-38 (noting that none of the classic views of separation of powers "has clear implications
for statutory interpretation").
181. Id. at 59.
182. Id. at 59-60.
183. Id. at 60 (noting, however, that the rhetoric was more hostile than the actual practice).
184. Currently viewed, civil law principles give judges some leeway to interpret statutes. Today's civil
law judges use interpretive methods that include the text, legislative history, context, and the purpose of the
provision, with the latter normally tipping the balance. Carl Baudenbacher, Some Remarks on the Method of
Civil Law, 34 TEx. INT'L L.J. 333, 345 (1999). Modem "courts tend to take into account the social reality at the
time of the application of the law" and consider both the "micro-consequences" and the "macro-consequences"
of judicial decisions. Id. at 346.
185. Miran Damaka, A Continental Lawyer in an American Law School: Trials and Tribulations of
Adjustment, 116 U. PA. L. REV. 1363, 1374-75 (1968) [hereafter Damalka, Law School]; Nollent, supra note
167, at 297. The French students with whom Nollent worked perceived that "Itihe law is not a set of tools to be
stretched according to the parties' needs, but the expression of the true, adequate response to a problem." Id. at
287.
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b. Existence of Holes to Fill: Codes versus Statutes
Comprehensive codes have long been a feature of the civil law landscape.
8 6
A code leaves relatively few opportunities for judicial law creation because it is
more than just a group of statutes.
[T]he continental concept of code is composed of three basic ideas. First,
the code is the complete body of law within the jurisdiction. Second, the
code is the voice of the sovereign and must be enacted by the
sovereign .... Third, the code is an ordering, simplifying and
systematizing of the authoritative legal materials so that they may be
retrieved easily. S8
Legislators achieve comprehensiveness by creating the code in an a priori,
logical fashion.'88 Each statutory compartment reflects a set of general principles
that guide a judge,'89 whose goal is certainty and uniformity in applying these
principles, even if individual justice might be sacrificed.' 9° Under the traditional
approach, "the right result of interpretation [could] be deduced from the written
186. France adopted a procedural code in the seventeenth century. EDWARD M. WISE, EDITOR'S
PREFACE, THE FRENCH CODE OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE, REVISED ED. xv (Fred B. Rothman & Co. 1988)
(discussing the Ordinance of 1670). Later, under the influence of late eighteenth-century philosophers, written,
statutory law came to be seen as a part of the social contract, expressing the popular will, and thus as the only
source of law. Ancel, supra note 171, at 2. The French Penal Code of 1791 and the Napoleonic era codes of
1808 (Code d'instruction Criminelle) and 1810 (Code Pinal) are manifestations of that philosophical tradition.
This principle of codification remained entrenched in France and spread to civil law countries generally.
Gerhard OW. Mueller, Foreword, in THE FRENCH PENAL CODE xiii (Jean F. Moreau & Gerhard O.W. Mueller
trans., F.B. Rothman 1960) ("The Criminal Law of practically all Civil Law countries rests on codes.... France
is the motherland of modem codification, and the Napoleonic Code Pinal is the most widely followed penal
code in the world."); see also, Ancel, supra note 169, at 10-12 (tracing the spread of the codification movement
in other European countries). However, "[t]he assumption of a complete-and therefore self-sufficient-
code.., is at best an historical footnote today .... and most modem civil law countries acknowledge the need
for some judge-made law. Baudenbacher, supra note 184, at 336-37.
187. Shapiro, supra note 161, at 429.
188. Ancel, supra note 169, at 5 (noting that the Napoleonic era codes were not merely compilations of
statutes, they were intellectually rigorous organizations of a particular area of law). Ancel points out that the
Penal Code of 1810 is "drafted with great clarity and the various provisions are presented systematically and
methodically" such that "[cirimes of the same generic type are gathered in neighboring Articles, even though
they may vary as to their gravity or sanction." Id. (describing the basic framework). This framework was
modified slightly in 1958 to account for administratively created petty offenses. Id. at 5-6; see also id. at 6-7
(describing the basic scheme in more detail); Nollent, supra note 167, at 284 (contrasting the French penchant
for universally valid precepts with the English goal of providing solutions to individual disputes). The new
Penal Code adopted in 1992 retained the basic structure of the Napoleonic era Code. Tomlinson, supra note
14 1, at 2.
189. In France, the definitions of specific offenses contained in the Code were quite broad. Tomlinson,
supra note 141, at 19-20 (discussing the 1992 Code and noting that the approach "reflects continuity with the
past"). Historically, Parliament "found it desirable to employ open-ended definitions so that the judges would
have at their disposal an adequate legal arsenal for responding to antisocial conduct." Id. at 20.
190. Damagka, Structures, supra note 123, at 483 (noting that the civil law places cases in fixed categories
and is satisfied with a fit that is close enough in the individual case; it aspires to certainty and uniformity even at the
sacrifice of individual "justice").
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law by way of mechanical application of a certain method,"'9' and thus a judge
had few opportunities to do anything but analyze whether a set of facts fits within
one code section versus another. 92 While modem commentators point out that
judges bring their own preconceptions to the task of applying the law and thus
leave personal marks on interpretation, 93 judges continue to be restrained from
activism "by the traditional rule, supported by all the doctrinal writers, that courts
should interpret penal statutes strictly."' 9 The common law tradition is different.
In England, the judge-created common law was never completely superseded by
statutes, let alone by codes.' 95 Over the centuries, various attempts to enact
Continental-style codes failed, 96 at least in part because the proposals seemed an
attack on the common law itself.'97 In England, criminal law and procedure
largely remained the creation of judges up to and after the time of the American
Revolution. 
98
This attitude toward the source of criminal law carried over to the United
States. At the time the Sixth Amendment was adopted, judges still had the power
191. Baudenbacher, supra note 184, at 348.
192. Under the French Penal Code of 1791, a judge "was to apply the written legal provision without
any discretion at interpretation." Ancel, supra note 169, at 2. In the Penal Code of 1810, each offense had to be
"strictly defined by the law," which resulted in statutes that contained detailed distinctions among various ways
of committing offenses. Id. at 8 (referring to "the casuistry of the Special Part"). Article 408 of the Code is an
example of such detailed definitions. See The Napoleon Series, France: Penal French Penal Code of 1810,
http://www.napoleon-series.org/research/government/france/penalcode/c-penalcode3b.html (last visited June 5,
2008) (on file with the McGeorge Law Review).
193. Baudenbacher, supra note 184, at 348 (noting that since the 1970s, scholars influenced by modem
hermeneutics no longer believe that legal interpretation by civilian judges is mechanical).
194. Tomlinson, supra note 141, at 20 ("[Tlhe courts' adherence to that rule sometimes is rather
shaky."); see also id. at 3-4 (noting that the traditional approach continues today, although the modern code
leaves room for some judicial gap filling).
195. See generally, e.g., Glendon, supra note 161, at 664-65 (noting, however, the discrepancy between
theory and reality in both systems); Nollent, supra note 167, at 284 (explaining why it is difficult for systematic
rules to emerge from the common law method); POPKIN, supra note 172, at 13 (noting that in sixteenth- and
seventeenth-century England "[s]tatutes were understood to provide partial rather than comprehensive
solutions"). But see Shapiro, supra note 161, at 429 (noting the debunking of the "old myth that continental
judges decided cases solely by reference to the code and common law judges solely by stare decisis").
196. See generally Shapiro, supra note 161, at 431-62 (tracing various failed attempts between the
fifteenth- and early eighteenth-centuries). Shapiro concludes that the failure was mainly due to "general
weaknesses in English constitutional arrangements" (id. at 463) and to recurrent patterns in English political life
pitting conservative and moderate against "more radical" forces. Id. at 464.
197. Shapiro explains that conservative and moderate urges to "winnow[] and systematiz[e]" existing
statutes led to codification proposals. However,
[o]nce the subject of codification was broached in Parliament ... more radical forces raised the issue
of codification of the common law, and this almost inevitably led to, or was perceived as, a radical
attack on the common law itself. At that point moderate support for any kind of codification
disappeared.
Id. at 464.
198. See generally, e.g., ROLLIN M. PERKINS, CRIMINAL LAW 24-25 (2d ed. 1969) (discussing the
development of common law and its relation to statutes); PAuL H. ROBINSON, CRIMINAL LAW 66-67 (1997)
(noting that "[tiwo hundred years ago English criminal law generally was uncodified," being "embodied in
judicial opinions").
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to define new crimes. The Supreme Court removed that power from federal
judges in 1816,' 99 but did not alter their common law power to recognize and
modify-and perhaps to create-substantive criminal defenses. ° In the states,
where legislation was sparse, the power of judges to create law was essential to
the operation of government in the early Republic and into the nineteenth
century.20 ' As recently as 1984, state judges have used common law powers to
define new crimes.0 2 In addition, even when crimes are defined by statute, judges
203still turn to the common law to refine and flesh out the statutory base.
While both traditions have admitted that trial judges sometimes have to
create law to fill the holes left by the legislature, the civil law tradition leaves
fewer holes to fill and more effectively restrains judicial exuberance in doing so.
c. The Role of Higher Courts
Both France and the majority of United States jurisdictions have two layers
of courts above the trial level. However, the higher courts function quite
differently in the two systems, both in terms of the powers they exercise and the
judges' perceptions of their roles. First, higher courts in the two systems have
199. United States v. Coolidge, 14 U.S. (1 Wheat.) 415 (1816); United States v. Hudson & Goodwin, 11
U.S. (7 Cranch) 32 (1812). But see Ben Rosenberg, The Growth of Federal Criminal Common Law, 29 AM. J.
CRIM. L. 193, 202-08 (2002) (arguing that federal common law crimes still exist in the United States and giving
examples).
200. The federal courts have long recognized self-defense despite the lack of a general statute defining
it. E.g., Starr v. United States, 153 U.S. 614 (1894); United States v. Nevels, 490 F.3d 800, 805 (10th Cir.
2007). Entrapment is another example of federal judges using common law powers to create a defense, although
cloaked in the thin disguise of effecting legislative intent. E.g., Jacobson v. United States, 503 U.S. 540, 548-49
(1992); Sorrells v. United States, 287 U.S. 435, 441-42, 445-46 (1932). But see United States v. Oakland
Cannabis Buyers' Coop., 532 U.S. 483, 490 (2001) (noting that the necessity defense was controversial even at
common law and questioning, but not deciding, whether federal courts have the power to recognize a necessity
defense not provided by statute).
201. EVAN HAYNES, THE SELECTION AND TENURE OF JUDGES 95-96 (National Conference of Judicial
Councils 1944). Haynes notes that at the beginning of the nineteenth century in the U.S. there was "no
considerable body of statute law [at the state level], and very little local precedent, and the courts of necessity
acted frequently without the aid of controlling authority of any kind." Id. at 95-106. Courts were to some extent
"thought of as entrusted with powers which we should now regard as purely legislative .. " Id. at 96.
Nevertheless, there was widespread popular hostility towards the common law and a longing for statutes that
would eliminate the need for it. Id.
202. See State v. Home, 319 S.E. 2d 703 (S.C. 1984) (creating a new crime but making it prospective in
application). See generally Neil Colman McCabe, State Constitutions and Substantive Criminal Law, 71 TEMP.
L. REV. 521, 523-26 (1998) (discussing the power to create common law crimes).
203. E.g., Morissette v. United States, 342 U.S. 246, 250-51 (1952) (interpreting statute as adopting the
analogous common law mens rea); see also Liparota v. United States, 471 U.S. 419, 426 (1985) (using the
common law to interpret a regulatory crime); FRIEDMAN, A HISTORY OF AMERICAN LAW 290 (3d ed. 2005)
(noting that nineteenth-century codification meant that "[jiudges lost the power to invent new crimes; but the
common law still defined the precise meaning and application of old crimes, like rape or theft"). In addition,
some states continue to recognize common law crimes but do not allow the creation of new ones; leave to the
common law the definition of entire statutory crimes or isolated terms; allow the common law to fill gaps in
statutory coverage; or permit judges to expand common law definitions to cover new situations. See John T.
Parry, The Virtue of Necessity: Reshaping Culpability and the Rule of Law, 36 HOUS. L. REV. 397,449 (1999).
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different powers. As noted above, French intermediate courts have true appeal
powers, and so they reconsider both the factual and the legal decisions of the trial
court.' °4 This contrasts with intermediate appellate courts in the United States,
which review only questions of law in criminal cases. In this sense, intermediate
appellate courts and supreme courts in the United States are similar to one
another. They are also similar to France's highest highest court-the Cour de
Cassation In contrast to the intermediate courts in France, all of these courts
have only the power of review: the power to evaluate legal, but not factual
rulings.' °6
The courts with review power are the bodies that ultimately can rein in any
creativity shown by lower-court judges in making legal decisions. Thus, it is
telling that the nature of the review power is different in the two countries. First,
courts in the United States lack true review power in that they can, at times,
207substitute their own decision for that of the lower court. More importantly,
however, is the different role that the review power plays in the two countries.
The review power "serves primarily the 'public' interest in upholding and
protecting the legal order itself., 20 8 However, the two traditions instill different
notions of what it means to uphold and protect the legal order, that is, different
notions of the judicial relationship toward legislation.
In the common law tradition, "upholding and protecting the legal order" has
had more to do with ensuring uniformity in application of rules and less to do
with adherence to a legislative mandate per se.2°9 However, the common law
tradition has never taken the goal of uniformity that seriously. There was a
marked lack of appellate institutions in England 2 0 and careful review of criminal
204. See supra note 153.
205. See generally, e.g., Dervieux, supra note 140, at 230-32; Frase, supra note 127, at 2-3; Sofie M.F.
Geeroms, Comparative Law and Legal Translation: Why the Terms Cassation, Revision and Appeal Should Not
be Translated. . ., 50 AM. J. COMP. L. 201 (2002); Nicolas Marie Kublicki, An Overview of the French Legal
System from an American Perspective, 12 B.U. INT'L L. REV. 57 (1994); Patey, supra note 154, at 385-86;
WISE, supra note 186.
206. Jolowicz, supra note 153, at 620 (noting that in a true review dynamic, the higher court looks only
at alleged procedural and substantive legal errors and can only affirm the original decision or quash it and
remand the case for further proceedings).
207. See id.
208. Id. In contrast, appeal serves the private interests of the parties in the outcome of the cases. See id.
209. Geeroms, supra note 205, at 219-33 (discussing the present and historical English systems). In
common law countries today, whatever uniformity exists in judge-made law is achieved largely through the
principle of stare decisis. E.g., LIEF H. CARTER, REASON IN LAW 37-39 (1979); MELVIN ARON EISENBERG, THE
NATURE OF THE COMMON LAW 47-50 (1988); see also GEORGE P. FLETCHER & STEVE SHEPPARD, AMERICAN
LAW IN A GLOBAL CONTEXT: THE BASICS 80-82 (2005) (explaining various principles of stare decisis and the
nature of uniformity achieved through those principles); CARTER, supra, at 109-10 (noting that reliance on
precedent, as opposed to natural law principles, is a relatively recent development in the common law);
FLETCHER & SHEPPARD, supra, at 35 (noting same). However, for the proposition that uniformity was hard-won
in the English law, see The Rule of Precedent in the Criminal Courts, 5 J. CRIM. L. 242 (1941).
210. Many of the appellate-level institutions that developed in England came after the American
Revolution. For example, the Court of Crown Cases Reserved was created in 1848, and major advances in
criminal appeals did not occur until the Criminal Appeal Act of 1907. See generally Orfield, supra note 77, at
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convictions was not the norm in the early years of the United States.2 ' Indeed,
the Supreme Court has frequently indicated that there is no constitutional right to
appellate review of criminal convictions. 2 Even today, where appellate review is
widely available in the United States, the goal of uniformity is thwarted by the
bar on review of acquittals,"3 the fact that high courts typically have discretion
not to review the legal decisions of intermediate courts,14 and a variety of
requirements that limit review jurisdiction at both the intermediate and high court
levels.25 On the other hand, when an appellate court does hear a case, it acts as if
it were a partner to the legislature in the task of lawmaking; for example,
appellate courts in common law countries can-and do-create generally binding
rules which have the power of law.16
335-36; Geeroms, supra note 205, at 224 (noting lack of an appellate system in colonies). Writs of error, more
modest reviews of a trial-court record, were not generally available in criminal cases prior to 1700; after that,
they were available to misdemeanants but felons needed approval of the Attorney General to seek the writ.
Rossman, supra note 157, at 525.
211. For example, federal circuit courts lacked the power to review criminal cases until 1879. Rossman,
supra note 157, at 521. Supreme Court review of criminal cases was also spotty. Id. at 521-24. State courts
employed writs of error, which involved very limited, even mechanical, evaluation of the face of the trial court
record. Id. at 525.
212. Id. at 521 n.4 (collecting cases).
213. This situation results from the double-jeopardy bar on appeal of acquittals. See supra note 156.
214. E. ALLAN FARNSWORTH, AN INTRODUCTION TO THE LEGAL SYSTEM OF THE UNITED STATES 42
(3d ed. 1996).
215. See generally, e.g., WAYNE R. LAFAVE, JEROLD H. ISRAEL, & NANCY J. KING, CRIMINAL
PROCEDURE 1289-98 (4th ed. 2004) (summarizing criminal procedure rules regarding mootness, concurrent
sentences, waiver or forfeiture of appeal rights, and plain error); id. at 1298-310 (discussing harmless error).
216. This power results from the practice of courts to follow relevant precedent set by higher courts in
the appropriate judicial hierarchy and from stare decisis (the practice of appellate courts to adhere to their own
precedent unless it is formally distinguished or overruled). See generally William N. Eskridge, Jr., Overruling
Statutory Precedents, 76 GEO. L.J. 1361 (1988) ("[Today] an American court does not consider itself
'inexorably bound by its own precedents, but, in the interest of uniformity of treatment to litigants, and of
stability and certainty in the law ... will follow the rule of law which it has established in earlier cases unless
clearly convinced that the rule was originally erroneous or is no longer sound because of changed conditions
and that more good than harm would come by departing from precedent."' (quoting James Wm. Moore &
Robert Stephen Oglebay, The Supreme Court, Stare Decisis and the Law of the Case, 21 TEX. L. REV. 514, 539-
40 (1943))); Glendon, supra note 161, at 673-74 ("[Tlhe judicial function in the civil law systems has
traditionally been regarded as limited to deciding particular cases, while common law courts are not only
supposed to settle disputes between the parties before the court but also to give guidance as to how similar
disputes should be handled in the future."); id. at 674-75 (noting that the role of common law judges includes
using precedent to "lay[] down and develop[] broad principles" while civil law courts leave it to legislatures to
"lay[] down broad rules," focusing instead on just resolving disputes); see also Eskridge, supra, at 1362 (noting
that regarding stare decisis common law precedents have the strongest presumption of correctness,
constitutional precedents a weaker presumption, and "statutory precedents ... often enjoy a super-strong
presumption of correctness"); Glendon, supra note 161, at 677 (discussing how stare decisis differs from
judicial consideration of the "intrinsic merits" of case law); Thomas R. Lee, Stare Decisis in Historical
Perspective: From the Founding Era to the Rehnquist Court, 52 VAND. L. REV. 647, 662, 664-66 (1999)
(observing that the Framers of the United States Constitution expected that federal judges would be subject to
some notion of binding precedent ranging from a strict notion of stare decisis to flexibility to "correct errors in
previous declarations"). But see id. at 659-60 (observing that "the doctrine of stare decisis is of relatively recent
origin," in that Hale, writing in 1713, could assert that judicial pronouncements had the force of law only
between the parties to the case giving rise to the rule). Lee notes that this approach resulted from the notion that
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The role of review in the civil law tradition is quite different. "Upholding and
protecting the legal order" has more to do with ensuring that trial judges adhere
as precisely as possible to the outcome-determining standards set by the
legislature.1 7 The Cour de Cassation, is required to hear all cases brought at the
behest of either party.218 However, when it does so, the Cour de Cassation does
not act as a partner to the legislature. Not only does it lack the power to issue
generally binding rules of law, it is difficult for the Cour de Cassation to issue a
binding rule even in the case under consideration." 9 In fact, in its original, pure
form, the French Cour de Cassation was meant "as a means for controlling the
judges and preventing them from trespassing on the prerogatives of the
legislature: decisions which went beyond the strict confines-of written law must
be annulled. ' 220 In short, the role of the civil law judge is not to create new law
but to "implement existing law.' 22'
Thus, the two traditions differ in the extent to which reviewing courts can
and will rein in trial judges who stray from strict adherence to legislative
mandates. In the civil law tradition, review functions to ensure trial court
compliance with legislative mandates. While this may also happen in the
common law tradition, it is just as likely that the higher court will collaborate in
the process of independently interpreting and invalidating statutes and in the
process of judicial law creation.
a judicial decision was regarded merely as evidence of the law, not as the law itself; this "declaratory theory"
saw the judicial function as declaring the law, not making it. Id. While it is unclear exactly when stare decisis
came to be accepted in English common law, most historians agree that it was in the eighteenth and early
nineteenth centuries. Id. at 661. But see Baudenbacher, supra note 184, at 349-51 (noting that strict reliance on
precedent by the high courts in common law countries has not been the case in recent years); Glendon, supra
note 161, at 673-74 (indicating that the differences in traditions may be breaking down in modern times as
common law judges focus more on individualized justice than on broad principles and so behave more like civil
law courts).
217. Damagka, Structures, supra note 123, at 484; Geeroms, supra note 205, at 205. Geeroms notes that
the Cour de Cassation "was established to ensure the correct application of the legislation in force, and to
preserve its uniformity." Id. But see id. at 206 (noting that the Cour de Cassation today has an expanded role
that includes ensuring uniformity in case law).
218. C. PR. PEN. §§ 546-547 (regarding appeals from police court); id. §§ 496-497 (regarding appeals
from correctional court); id. § 567 (regarding review by the cassation court). See generally Geeroms, supra note
205, at 204-08 (regarding the history of the cassation court).
219. The opinions of the Cour de Cassation are technically advisory. On remand to a different panel of
the lower court, that court is free to disregard the advice. Originally, the decision of the remand court was final
as to the parties to the case. Since 1837, however, if the remand court disagrees with the cassation panel, the
case goes up to the Cour de Cassation again, where a full court considers the legal issues. It is not bound by the
decision of the earlier cassation panel. The full panel may either remand the case yet again or make a final
decision that is binding on the lower courts considering that case. See, e.g., Baudenbacher, supra note 184, at
350-51; Kublicki, supra note 205, at 63-68; Jolowicz, supra note 153, at 621-22.
220. Jolowicz, supra note 153, at 621.
221. Mufiiz-ArgUelles & Fraticelli-Torres, supra note 147, at 6. But see Baudenbacher, supra note 184,
at 349-51 (noting that courts in civil law countries increasingly rely on precedent, but admitting that the
traditions continue to deal with precedent differently).
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4. Socialization of Judges
The material presented in Subsection 3 seems to support the stereotype that
common law judges are problem-solving law creators and civil law judges are
12technocrats applying legislative mandates. However, such rigid notions may
now be out of date. In France, for example, judges have some power to create
interstitial rules, and the United States has moved from a context in which judges
were the main source of substantive criminal law rules to one in which legislation
largely occupies the field. Thus, it is more interesting to ask how active and
imaginative judges tend to be in exercising their power to interpret or create
rules, as opposed to being strongly deferential to legislative goals and policies.
The answer to this question has much to do with expectations-influenced by
tradition and stereotypes-regarding the judicial role. To the extent that judges
are seen-and see themselves-as legitimate sources of legal rules, trial judges
are more likely to take advantage of whatever opportunities their system provides
for interpreting and creating law. In addition, appellate judges are more likely to
tolerate, if not encourage, trial judges in taking such steps. On the other hand, if
judges are trained to see their role as merely applying legislative mandates,
appellate judges will police deviations from those mandates, and trial judges are
less likely to risk such deviations. Thus, it probably is not surprising that the two
traditions differ in the socialization of their judges 223 The divergence results from
significant differences in both basic legal training and the career path to
judgeship.
The formation of the iudge's basic role expectations, and training in legal
techniques to fulfill those expectations, normally begins in law school.U Law
students in the United States focus on case law rather than statutes or academic
commentary. Memorization of legal rules and development of overarching
logical structures play a small part in an American law student's preparation.
Instead, students practice manipulating rules of law in the context of ever-
changing factual hypotheticals. Students quickly learn that there is not normally
one "right" answer to the legal problem presented by a set of facts. The goal is to
convince the court to find the most just solution for the facts of the case at hand.
222. E.g., Damalka, Structures, supra note 123, at 486 (noting that civil law judges must be technical
experts who have mastered bureaucratic skills); id. at 507, 521-23 (discussing behavior expectations), id. at
509-11 (contrasting the problem-solving role and the technical role); John Henry Merryman, Legal Education
There and Here: A Comparison, 27 STAN. L. REv. 859, 866-67 (1975) (noting that "[in the United States, the
practicing lawyer or judge is seen as a sort of social engineer, as a person specially equipped to perceive and
attempt to solve social problems" and that a civil law judge "is seen as a technician, as the operator of a
machine designed and built by others").
223. See generally Mufiiz-Argtielles & Fraticelli-Torres, supra note 147.
224. However, the common law tradition has long tolerated non-legally trained judges at the lower court
levels. See, e.g., Adrian Vermeule, Should We Have Lay Justices?, 59 STAN. L. REv. 1569, 1573 (2007) ("In the
United States, lay judges of various sorts sit in some forty states, although usually on low-stakes matters, and in
some cases subject to de novo review by a lawyer-judge."). The English tradition of lay judges is even more
widespread. See, e.g., id.
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Thus, professors push students to critique the wisdom of particular statutes and
judicial decisions and to be prepared to use the resulting insights to make
arguments in practice. Notably, this basic legal education, leading to a Juris
Doctor degree, is the only training formally required for a common law judge.225
However, few graduates become judges immediately upon leaving law
school. Instead, most judges in common law systems begin their careers
practicing law. They do not become judges until they have demonstrated their
skills as practitioners, their dedication to community service, and, in some places,
their political acumen effectively enough to be appointed by a political body or
elected by the public.2 6 Once on the bench, they can be voted out of office or
removed for cause.227 Although their legal decisions can be reversed on appeal,
the competence of their work is not evaluated by higher-ups in a bureaucracy."'
The story is completely different for judges in the civil law tradition. At
school, law students focus on abstract rules and principles,229 which they
memorize along with the statutes reflecting them.230 They place these concepts
into a comprehensive tree-like diagram of the law as a whole-a "legal
grammar"-supported by an understanding of the jurisprudence behind the
structure. 3 Students learn to test both legal analysis and potential changes in the
225. Today many judges voluntarily undergo specialized training, for example at the National Judicial
College. See The National Judicial College, http://www.judges.org/ (last visited May 24, 2008) (on file with the
McGeorge Law Review); see also Mufiiz-Argtelles & Fraticelli-Torres, supra note 147, at 29-30 (describing
training required for English lay judges).
226. See, e.g., Larry C. Berkson, Judicial Selection in the United States: A Special Report, 64
JUDICATURE 176, 178-93 (1980) (summarizing modes of judicial selection in contemporary United States and
providing extensive tables); Mufiiz-Argiielles & Fraticelli-Torres, supra note 147, at 25-28 (describing
recruitment in England); American Judicature Society, State Judicial Selection,
http://ajs.org/selection/sel-stateselect.asp (last visited May 24, 2008) (on file with the McGeorge Law Review)
(summarizing judicial selection methods in the United States).
227. See, e.g., Randy J. Holland & Cynthia Gray, Judicial Discipline: Independence with
Accountability, 5 WIDENER L. SYMP. J. 117 (2000) (discussing removal of judges in the United States
historically and at present); American Judicature Society, Methods of Removing State Judges, http://www.
ajs.org/ethics/eth_impeachement.asp (last visited May 11, 2008) (on file with the McGeorge Law Review)
(summarizing methods of removing judges in the United States).
228. Holland & Gray, supra note 227, at 128.
229. See, e.g., Nollent, supra note 167, at 287 (noting that French students learn a set of rules and
principles, while English students learn a skill); see also Dama~ka, Law School, supra note 184, at 1365 (noting
that law students in civil law countries are trained to use both legal concepts that are more rigorous, or less
amorphous than those used in the United States and also concepts that are "more general, sometimes almost
cathedral-like").
230. This observation is based on the author's work with law students in Venezuela, Mexico, Spain, and
Italy.
231. Damalka, Law School, supra note 185, at 1365-68 (discussing the development of "[tlhe
[g]rammar of [I]aw"); see also id. at 1365 (noting that law students in civil law countries are trained to use legal
concepts that are more rigorous, or less amorphous than those used in the United States; at the same time, they
would also learn about "more general, sometimes almost cathedral-like concepts"). For an example of a civil
law legal tree diagram, see MARY ANN GLENDON, PAOLO G. CAROZZA, & COLIN B. PICKER, COMPARATIVE
LEGAL TRADITIONS 139 (Thomson/West 3d ed. 2007).
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law by the logic that flows from the legal grammar.! They are taught to assume
a relatively closed, orderly system displaying "logical consistency over relatively
wide areas., 233 This approach results in "norm saturation" and an unbending
attitude toward the norms . Professors help students see how the codes and
statutes fit into this structure, but they do not encourage students to use the law
creatively to resolve factual problems.235 Indeed, facts are rarely, if ever,
mentioned.236 This may be because, in practice, facts will not drive the analysis.237
The goal will be to figure out the proper statutory and conceptual category for the
case at hand and fit the facts into it.2 s This approach prevails even if the fit does
not serve nuanced individualized justice, as certainty and uniformity are higher
goals.239 Thus, the best student will not be the creative problem solver, but rather
the one who finds "the 'right' answer to the problem at hand.
' 240
The differences in training continue after law school in the career path to the
bench. Becoming a judge in the civil law tradition involves merit-based
competition, rigid training, and a bureaucratic approach to advancement.2 41 In
232. Damaika, Law School, supra note 185, at 1366-67.
233. Id. at 1370.
234. See Damaika, Structures, supra note 123, at 505-09.
235. Damalka, Law School, supra note 185, at 1367-68 ("Statutory or code provisions are systematically
presented on a level which seems to provide only vague guidelines for the solution of actual cases."); id. at 1368
(observing that the student sees little attention paid to the practical operation of legal rules, including "the
influence of procedural considerations on substantive issues" and that students are not generally taught to
engage in problem solving); Nollent, supra note 167, at 287 (indicating that even when presented with a
problem, students learn to explore only one or two avenues of resolution).
236. Damalka, Law School, supra note 185, at 1368 (noting that if the professor refers to specific cases
at all, it will be "as illustrations of how the court evolved legal rules, adapted to the solution of the case, from
the more general ones found in the code or statute").
237. Baudenbacher, supra note 184, at 352 (remarking on the "grudging manner in which the facts of
the case are treated in continental judgments" and noting that "[t]he French Cour de Cassation often only makes
allusions to the facts" (quoting KONRAD ZWEIGERT & HEIN KOTz, AN INTRODUCTION TO COMPARATIVE LAW
(Tony Weir trans., 3d ed. 1998)).
238. Id. at 336. Nollent, supra note 167, at 283 (noting that French lawyers have a conceptual, abstract
view of law as a series of fundamental principles, not as a mechanism to resolve disputes).
239. Damalka, Structures, supra note 123, at 483 ("[T[he hierarchical model is characterized by the
high premium placed on certainty of decisionmaking."). According to Damaika, "[w]henever the consideration
of individualized circumstances prevents the conversion of the bases of the particular decision into a general,
certain formula, such consideration must be forgone." Id.; see also Damalka, Law School, supra note 185, at
1370 (noting that the graduate of civil law training "will believe that legal discourse of real importance proceeds
on the level of rules he is familiar with, and that emphasis on factual questions and too much concern about
justice in a given case betray a non-technical, layman's approach...").
240. Damaika, Law School, supra note 185, at 1369 (noting that the pedagogy stresses "[1]ogical
consistency within the array" of rules, principles, and legal grammar, and little argument about what might be
the best rule or argument from a policy standpoint).
241. See generally Damaika, Structures, supra note 123, at 486. See also HAYNES, supra note 201, at
100-01 (noting that despite the democratic revolutions of the mid-nineteenth century, European countries
"preserved the idea that judges should be competently selected, and free of political pressure" and contrasting
the situation with that in the United States). France experimented with the common law approach to judicial
selection in the 1790s, but concluded that unsuitable people were made judges. Id. at 158 (noting the election of
painters, store clerks, and a gardener). The Constitution of 1799 made judges appointive, "as they have
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France,2 2 for example, law students who want to enter the judiciary take an exam
at the completion of their studies for the basic law degree.24'3 The judicial exam is
comprehensive and competitive, and only those with the best results will be
244asked to join the government bureaucracy for judges. This selection process
reflects "the idea that judges should be competently selected, and free of political
pressure." 245 Once selected, the new judge will undergo rigorous specialized
judicial training 246 and will then become a career civil servant in a hierarchicalb 247
bureaucracy. Although promotion through the ranks of this bureaucracy can be
based on politics, 248  it is mainly based on competence in following role
249
expectations.
We have briefly explored the training, selection, and advancement of judges
because such factors influence a judge's sense of independence. Judges in the
United States-including at the trial level-are apt to feel freer to depart from
remained ever since." Id. at 158-59 (noting that judges were also "made irremovable, except for misconduct").
242. "The French system of judicial organization (as finally evolved), and of judicial selection and
tenure, have been copied with more or less exactness by most of Europe excepting England." Id. at 161; see
also Damaika, Structures, supra note 123, at 486 (describing recruitment and training in the civil law tradition
generally); Mufiiz-Argiielles & Fraticelli-Torres, supra note 147, at 9-11 (noting nature of differences in Spain
and Germany).
243. Mufiiz-Argiielles & Fraticelli-Torres, supra note 147, at 11-17 (describing France and Spain);
HAYNES, supra note 201, at 163. But see Mufiiz-Argiielles & Fraticelli-Torres, supra note 140, at 13-14
(describing alternate route used by some French judges); see also HAYNES, supra note 201, at 164 (writing in
the 1930s and describing this alternate approach).
244. In France, this bureaucracy, the Magistrature, includes both judges and prosecutors and ias done
so as far back as 1809 if not before. Coudert, supra note 79, at 330-32. "The magistrature consists not only of
judges in our sense but of government attorneys (called collectively the parquet), resembling somewhat our
public prosecutors. The members of the magistrature pass freely from the bench to the parquet and back again
to the bench." HAYNES, supra note 201, at 164.
245. HAYNES, supra note 201, at 100-01 (noting that this approach survived the democratic revolutions
of the mid-nineteenth century and contrasting the situation with that in the United States); see also id. at 158-61
(tracing the fate of the Revolutionary-era French experiment in elected judges and the rejection of a proposal to
elect judges in the 1880s).
246. David Applebaum, Cogestion and Beyond: Change and Continuity in Modern French Legal
Education-A Design for U.S. Law Schools, 10 NOVA L.J. 297 (1985-1986) (focusing on post-graduate
education of magistrates); Damaika, Structures, supra note 123, at 486; Mufiiz-Argiielles & Fraticelli-Torres,
supra note 147, at 10, 17-20. But see Mufiiz-Argiielles & Fraticelli-Torres, supra note 147, at 11, 22-25
(explaining that in Germany prospective judges receive specialized training during law-school and mandatory
internships).
247. E.g., HAYNES, supra note 201, at 163. Haynes notes that,
[judges] enter upon their judicial duties generally at the age of about 25. They spend their lives in
public service, starting in the smaller courts at very low salaries with the prospect of promotion, as
the years go by, from rank to rank; and the very remote possibility of eventually reaching the apex of
the whole judicial structure, the Court of Cassation.
Id.
248. "[Plromotion is the very life blood of a French judge; and until very recently he was largely
dependent for promotion on the good will of a political officer, namely the Minister of Justice." Id. at 164.
Haynes traces the system at id. at 164-65. Political pressure was a part of the system and influenced judicial
behavior until changes in 1934. Id. at 165-67.
249. Id. at 167-68 (noting that the French system as of 1934 takes politics out of the picture); see also
Damalka, Structures, supra note 123, at 486 (noting that promotion depends upon evaluations by supervisors).
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strict legislative mandates than their civil law counterparts because the system
trains and supports judges in creative problem solving. As one commentary has
noted, in civil law systems,
it is felt that courts in general and trial courts in particular, should shy
away from exercising a lawmaking function. Education, history,
recruitment at an early age, and the fact that career advancement depends
upon the views of others who may frown on judicial lawmaking inhibit
the European judge far more than the fear of reversal on review in the
United States, where judges are sometimes appointed precisely because
of their judicial activism.5
IV. RETURN TO THE COMMON LAW TRADITION
There is a remarkable similarity between the goals of criminal adjudication in
the civil law tradition and the goals of the structured guideline schemes thrown
out by the Supreme Court.25' Those guideline schemes were meant to achieve
predictability and uniformity in sentencing. Only some facts about the situation
or the defendant were deemed relevant. Otherwise, "[w]henever the
consideration of individualized circumstances prevents the conversion of the
bases of the particular decision into a general, certain formula, such consideration
must be forgone.,, 252 Although this statement fits the structured-guideline
philosophy, its author was describing the civil law approach.
The survey undertaken in Section III showed that the structure, norms, and
training of the civil law tradition work together to support the goals of
predictable, uniform, but not necessarily individualized justice. This result is
achieved in large part through close adherence to comprehensive rules and
categories established by legislative mandates. 253 The model involves narrowly
controlled fact finding at the trial level, regardless of who the fact finder is.
254
Judges lack broad powers-or even many opportunities-to interpret statutes,
255
let alone declare them invalid,256 and high courts focus on ensuring adherence to
legislative mandates. 257 Not surprisingly, the training, selection, and advancement
of judges reinforce these norms and role expectations.250
The mechanisms adopted by many of the structured sentencing schemes
echoed the practices of the civil law tradition. The United States Sentencing
250. Mufiiz-Argiielles & Fraticelli-Torres, supra note 147, at 7.
251. See supra notes 18-23.
252. Damalka, Structures, supra note 123, at 483.
253. See supra notes 186-94.
254. See supra Part II.B.2.
255. See supra Parts m.B.3.a and b.
256. See supra note 164.
257. See supra note 219.
258. See supra Part I.B.4.
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Guidelines, for example, were a comprehensive, code-like structure complete
with specific application rules.25 9 Fact finding was narrowly controlled by
requiring judges to explain their decisions260 and by allowing de novo review.261
Judges who felt that the mandatory sentences frustrated the goal of individualized
justice could do nothing about that result.
On the other hand, one system of judicial sentencing validated by the Court
is fully in line with the common law tradition of relative judicial independence to
administer individualized justice. This system-true indeterminate sentencing-
involves no legislative mandates262 and thus maximizes the common law tradition
of a judiciary that can act as a circuitbreaker in the machinery of justice. The
other alternative approved by the Court is advisory guidelines. The ability-and
willingness-of judges to be circuitbreakers in this system is less clear. Under
the federal advisory guideline approach, for example, the judge must calculate
the guideline sentence and explain on the record the factual and legal reasons for
263following it or not. In addition, both the prosecution and the defense can seek
264
review of the resulting sentence. If varying from the guidelines is presumed to
be "unreasonable," leading to a reversal of the trial judge's sentence, advisory
guidelines closely resemble the civil law approach. That is why it is important
that the Supreme Court rejected such an approach.265 Under the emerging
doctrine, the nature of the review for reasonableness 266 brings this advisory
system firmly back into the common law camp, as the guidelines no longer
restrict the judge's ability to decide which factors are relevant to sentencing or
how to weigh them, 67 and the judge can even disagree with legislative policy
268decisions. While this is not indeterminate sentencing, it is mighty close. It puts
the judge back into the problem-solver mode, consistent with tradition and
training.
Although the shift to advisory guidelines may return sentencing to the
common law tradition, has something been lost in the process? Legislatures
adopted structured sentencing to further uniformity and predictability and
because of disillusionment with the goal of rehabilitation.26 9 Advisory guidelines
allow judges to focus on rehabilitation, and they certainly threaten a reduction in
uniformity and predictability. 270 The criminal justice system generally may suffer
259. See, e.g., UNITED STATES SENTENCING COMMISSION, GUIDELINES MANUAL.
260. This requirement was similar to civil law "justified" verdicts. See supra note 147.
261. See supra note 59.
262. See generally supra notes 8-13 and accompanying text.
263. See supra note 20.
264. 18 U.S.C. §§ 3557, 3742 (2000); United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220, 260 (2005).
265. See supra notes 62-68.
266. See supra note 61.
267. Courts merely have to attend to broad sentencing goals. See Booker, 543 U.S. at 259-60.
268. Kimbrough v. United States, 128 S. Ct. 558 (2007).
269. See supra notes 16-17.
270. Booker, 543 U.S. at 263 (admitting that reasonableness review will not "produce the uniformity
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from such a reduction, and individualized sentencing does not necessarily help
defendants either.27' However, it remains to be seen whether judges, socialized
into a guidelines approach and subject to reasonableness review, actually produce
great disparities. In addition, the Court has emphasized that advisory guidelines
are not the only mechanisms available to legislatures. Jury determination of the
sentencing facts might increase the likelihood (although not completely ensure2 12 )
that legislative mandates would be followed. Neither of these models is as
efficient or uniform as mandatory, determinate sentencing. However, if the Sixth
Amendment right to jury trial really does include the right to a trial court
reflecting the common law tradition, legislatures may have to settle for
whichever of these models seems to minimize its concerns.
V. CONCLUSION
The legislatively mandated determinate sentencing systems adopted in the
late twentieth century represented a move toward the civil law tradition of courts
as mere conduits for the implementation of legislative will. As such, they were
out of step with the common law tradition of trial court discretion that had
operated to allow judges and juries to apply individualized justice even when
doing so would thwart legislative mandates. Historically, that discretion lay in
the hands of both juries and judges, and it operated at both the adjudication and
sentencing phases of trial. The Supreme Court reinstated that tradition by
requiring sentencing to be done by a jury or by a judge with substantial
discretion. The history and comparative study of discretion in the criminal justice
system resolve the puzzle of why the latter option-sentencing by a judge-
satisfies the Sixth Amendment right to jury trial.
that Congress originally sought to secure").
271. Judges with discretion can, of course, impose a sentence higher than the one advised by the guidelines.
This may be a real danger for some types of defendants, especially in jurisdictions where judges are elected and
therefore more subject to political pressure.
272. Jury nullification would presumably still operate. See supra notes 75-78 and accompanying text;
supra Part 11.B.2.

